Communication Ethics Facing the Ambivalence of Digital Technology

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A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

This article aims to review the concept of action and answer how communication ethics faces the ambivalence of digital technology. Using a critical-normative research method on the works of Aristotle and Hannah Arendt, this study finds that in the face of the ambivalence of digital technology, communication ethics needs to put digital actions back on the consciousness of the perpetrator. In addition, communication ethics must overcome banal clicks and deal with the robotic manipulators of digital systems. There are two ways to use it: first, a complicated way in the form of resistance to digital manipulators, and the second is a soft way, which is to reposition the three virtues, namely courage, honesty, and elegance, to build digital altruism in digital communication ethics.

INTRODUCTION

Technology Digital is *Information and Communication Technologies* (ICT). The term ICT has been used in academic circles since 2000 1980s. Digital technology is advancing rapidly and devastatingly, giving birth to a digital revolution. As a result, various internet-based platforms are present on social media, such as blogs (*Blogspot, WordPress, tumble*), microblogs (*Twitter, Weibo*), information content sharing sites (*Youtube* et al.), social networking sites (*LinkedIn, VK, Renren*), and wikis (Wikipedia). As a means of communication, cooperation, and sharing, social media is a step forward for developing communication and development.

Digital technology, which has driven the digital revolution, brings many benefits to life, in addition to forming community, communication, and friendship (Irawan et al., 2024). Digital communication greatly facilitates our lives, launches our business and profession, accelerates the learning process, and improves the quality of our lives. The latest literature on social media shows new possibilities in exploring digital information that will make it easier for us to monitor global information flows (Sloan & Quan-Haase, 2022, p. 12).

Some experts define the current situation. Thomas Kuhn, for example, calls the current situation an "anomaly," and Martin Heidegger calls this situation the revelation of a new reality through technology. David J. Gunkel states that we are in a "paradigm shift" of communication in which "computers and communication systems are beginning to be understood as another kind of subject – another kind of communicative one that confronts humans as users, calls them, and demands an appropriate response" (Gunkel, 2016, p. 246)

However, it must be admitted that digital technology that accelerates the digital revolution is ambivalent; that is, in digital technology, there are not only goodness, benefits, new hopes, progress, values, and power, which empower society, but also contain evil, anxiety, and threats, which can deceive society. The ambivalence is that, on the one hand, computers, the Internet, and social media can indeed create cyberspace, a vast space of communication. Still, simultaneously, it can carry out a panopticon strategy that can control and monitor customers, thus reducing the freedom of its customers. Digital technology has created a homo digitalis characterized by positional ambivalence. Rafael Capurro conveyed this in his 2017 work entitled Homo Digitalis (Hardiman, 2021, pp. 37–38). Homo digitalis are creatures that are controlled by the media, function as media, and adapt to the climate of digital technology. Homo digitalis is characterized by positional ambivalence.

Therefore, this study wants to answer the question: How does digital communication ethics deal with the ambivalence of digital technology? To that end, we will first review the "moral acts" according to Aristotle and Hannah Arendt and then examine how communication ethics addresses the ambivalence of digital technology.

THEORETICAL REVIEW

A review of "moral actions" in communication is critical because, so far, there have been significant changes in communication. Communication actions originally based on *corpus* (corporeal communication) are now more based on

digital technology called digital communication. This review of "moral actions" in communication will include a) Moral Actions with Fingers and b) Banal Actions with Fingers.

Moral Actions with Fingers

Moral actions with fingers here are actions or moral actions that are carried out by clicking on a digital device. In the scientific realm, moral actions with fingers are often abbreviated as "clicks," so "clicks" in this study are clicks as "moral actions." Aristotle's thoughts on action are contained in his work *Nicomachean Ethics.* Aristotle's thinking was necessary to unearth the "intrinsic value" of action. It focuses on *voluntarity* and *involuntariness*. Both are seen from the side of the perpetrator and the side of the action. An act is called unintentional if it is done by coercion or ignorance. On the other hand, an action is called intentional if the action is not really due to coercion or not really because of ignorance. In other words, the deliberate act is free and with knowledge, and the perpetrator is also free or deliberate (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 220).

Digital actions such as clicks or typing on a touchscreen can be understood from Aristotle's analysis of those actions. The clicking can be intentional or unintentional, so we can also use coercion and ignorance to judge digital actions. Coercion can lead the perpetrator to commit mixed actions, which are deliberate and, at the same time, unintentional actions. For this mixed action, Aristotle gave the following solution: to count it as intentional, that is, to avoid danger. Such actions do not take precedence but should be carried out (Hardiman, 2021, p. 217). Such a compelling situation is rare for us to experience in digital communication. So, digital communication happens in our freedom and knowledge, not our ignorance. Aristotle gave the following example of ignorance: because of being attacked, a person hits his opponent in self-defense, but the person struck dies. The perpetrator did not intend to kill, but as a result, his opponent was dead. Aristotle gave an example of ignorance: someone says something about another, even though it is a secret. He did not know that what he said to others was a secret. From the two examples, the difference is clear: ignorance concerns a lack of information, while ignorance concerns the implementation of an intention whose impact is unexpected (Hardiman, 2021, p. 218).

In general, we can argue that just as every other action is always related to the perpetrator's character, the click is also associated with the character of the gadget user. Aristotle spoke of "decisions" as a mirror of character (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 130). Aristotle argued that, in a person's decision, "the precedence is most obvious and shows a judgment of character more than the actions" (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 153). Aristotle distinguishes decisions from desire, passion, desire, and opinion.

Aristotle's explanation of these four things is beneficial. Decisions are not desires because decisions have the following qualities: 1) they can only be done by rational beings, 2) by people who have a strong will, 3) they concern things that have a reason, 4) they are contrary to desires, and 5) they are a form of executive power. The ethics of digital communication is greatly helped by

Aristotle's efforts to distinguish decisions from desires, passions, desires, and opinions. This is a functional normative approach to digital communication ethics. As moral beings, humans, or instead homo digitalists, are faced with ethical choices in digital communication to realize good and avoid evil. However, in reality, Aristotle said, homo-digitalists are not entirely rational. Why? This is because, in him, there are desires, passions, desires, and opinions that, in reality, are often in the form of gossip, which are often difficult to distinguish from decisions. A common phenomenon in digital communication is not ignorance or coercion but thoughtlessness that makes clicking something banal (wrong but considered ordinary) and obscures the various distinctions that Aristotle has made above. There are three effects of digitization of actions.

First, it is bodyless, meaning that the whole body without a body does not need to be presented in an action, even if the interaction is between humans and machines. This means that, behind one's online appearance, in the digital age, we cannot assume that a body is always accompanying it (cf. David J. Gunkel, 2016:233). Second, action is a quick movement that can precede a decision and is prone to banalization (the process of superficializing the meaning where mistakes are considered commonplace). In digital communication, the speed of information change and the number of choices often come simultaneously before reflection. As a result, digital actions such as clicks can become routine, mundane actions and events and even turn into reflexes due to the scarcity of reflective pauses. Third, actions no longer on a person's body are also uprooted from a specific location. Actions undergo deterritorialization (decreasing actions from a particular bond of location). Geographic location no longer determines the role because the locus is connected everywhere (globally) in the digital world.

The three, decorporealization, banalization, and deterritorialization of actions, have made actions fluid and anonymous (anonym). Badaracco Jr. and Webb (1995) argue that Digital communication ethics must encourage user awareness to re-detail the fluid and rapid series of digital actions to their origins in consciousness so that digital communication ethics can reposition humans as tool users and arouse user awareness.

Banal Actions with Fingers

Banal's actions are studied from Hannah Arendt's thoughts, initially found in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). Arendt's thesis: A Report on the Banality of Evil is a subtitle of the book. Mary K. Swingle emphasized what has been discussed above: that as gadget users, we are not only rational, but we also appear to have an adaptive attitude to the demands of the Internet. The Internet increasingly dominates people's perceptions and minds, so many "need to Internet standards" (Swingle, 2016, p. 161). Therefore, the above Aristotelian analysis needs to be complemented by a study conducted by Hannah Arendt. Arendt himself was a thinker whom Aristotle greatly influenced. In his book The Human Condition (1958), Arendt draws heavily on Aristotle's views on the relationship between action, virtue, and the polis in Nicomachean Ethics, particularly in his analysis of action. Meanwhile, Aristotle's analysis of

intentionality and unintentionality gets a conceptual pairing in Arendt's book Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) about the banality of evil.

Arendt's thesis, A Report on the Banality of Evil, is contained in the book's subtitlebook's subtitle. Arendt's main points can be put forward here as follows: A person will lose his ability to think and lose sensitivity to the reality of his crime if he is doing a routine crime with other people. Given that digitality differs from corporate reality, we need not rush to conclude that Arendt's analysis is entirely suitable for digital communication. The decorporéal realization of actions in digital communication does not have to have consequences on the mindlessness that causes clicks to become banal. In corporate communication, lies, obscenity, and hatred are still felt by the perpetrator in their actions. Still, in digital communication, they have lost their moral weight and become a strategy to increase viewers or likes.

Another thinker, Yaacov Lozowick, distinguishes evil into four levels: indifference, selfishness, cold-heartedness, and evil will. The measure is not on the impact of the action but on the perpetrator's motive. According to Arendt, people can be selfish, cold-hearted, and have evil intentions without caring about those things. That is the result of mindlessness. Lozowick argues the opposite with the alpinism thesis of evil. Crime is "trained" as a career on the rise. They are the alpinis of evil" (Lozowick, 2005, p. 279).

Arendt and Lozowick's views are not meaningful if we look at what happens in digital communication. Crime alpinism and crime banality in digital communication can work together to drive the crime industry in the digital space. Ordinary people like us who do not care about the digital environment and people who design hoaxes, pornography, and hate speech with malicious intent can "cooperate" with each other through the act of clicking banal to commit and spread crime on a global scale. When actions are digitally deterritorialized, the impact of those actions becomes unpredictable. Digital crime actors do not need to strive for technology and bureaucracy because ICT (Information and Communication Technology) systems have provided all that (Novia et al., 2024).

Digital communication ethics need to consider the conditions that Arendt warned about through his analysis because the ethical task is overcoming banal clicks. However, the transparency of users' data must be balanced by the openness of those who use it. As a result, transparency can be turned to them as supervision and control (Bdk. Agus Sudibyo, 2021:157). "The supervisory capitalists know anything about us, but their operations are designed to be unknowable to us," says Chris H. Gray (Gray, 2019).

METHODOLOGY
The research method used is critical-normative. Critical research aims to develop critical awareness and critical actions of research participants in facing social problems (Connole, 1993). This research aims to build understanding and crucial action on the ambivalence of digital technology so that humans cannot only take advantage of the positive side but also be unable to use digital technology. In addition, this critical method is normative critical, meaning that

in criticizing and developing critical actions, researchers use ethical norms: courage, honesty, and horror, which Aristotle discovered.

The data collection technique used: observation of literature conducted through the Internet, libraries, and in-depth interaction with the works of Aristotle (Connole et al., 1993), in which there is a sub-title A Report on the Banality of Evil as her thesis.

To study the work of Aristotle more, the researcher used the results of the study, among others, from F. Budi Hardiman, the Year 2021, entitled I Click then I am There, an article written by David J. Gunkel, the Year 2016, with the title "Paradigm Shift: Media Ethics in the Age of Intelligent Machines." As for reviewing Hannah Arendt's work, the researcher used the results of a study from Mary K. Swingle, 2016, titled i-Minds. How Cell Phones, Computers, Gaming, and Social Media are Changing Our Brains, Behavior, and the Evolution of Our Species; Judy Motion et al. In 2016, with the title Social Media and Public Relations. Fake Friends and Powerful Publics; Agus Sudibyo, 2021, with the title Tarung Digital. Computational Propaganda in Various Countries; Yaacov Lozowick, 2000, under the title Hitler's Bureaucrats. The Nazi Security Police and the Banality of Evil. The researcher ultimately writes other supporters in the bibliography.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results of this study are that *first*, in digital communication, actions become *fluid* and *anonymous* because they have been changed by the decorporealization, banalization, and deterritorialization of actions so that the consciousness of moral actors is eroded by the rapidity, fluidity, and anonymity of their actions. Therefore, digital communication ethics must place digital actions back on the perpetrators' awareness. *Second*, the DE corporeal and deterritorialization of actions, which are characters of digital communication, can lead to banal clicks, mainly if routine clicks cause the user's mindlessness. The moral sensitivity to missing clicks has placed users as free laborers of the digital crime industry, even if they are unaware of it. Therefore, communication ethics must overcome banal clicks and confront the robotic manipulators of digital systems (Vahtikari, 2016). *Third*, the way communication ethics deals with the ambivalence of digital technology is complex and soft, aiming to build digital altruism. The hard way is resistance to digital manipulators, while the smooth way in digital communication is to re-place Aristotle's ethics, namely the virtues of courage, honesty, and obedience.

These results will be discussed critically through three discussions: 1. Moral actions with fingers; 2. Banal action with fingers; and 3. How communication ethics deal with the ambivalence of digital technology.

Moral acts with fingers

In the scientific realm, moral actions with fingers are often abbreviated as "clicks." The actions in this study are based on Aristotle's thoughts in his work Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle's thinking was necessary to unearth the "intrinsic value" of action. It focuses on voluntary and involuntary happiness. Both are seen from the side of the perpetrator and the side of the action. An act

is called unintentional if it is done by coercion or ignorance. On the other hand, an action is called intentional if the action is not really due to coercion or not really because of ignorance. In other words, the deliberate act is free and with knowledge, and the perpetrator is also free or deliberate (Pakaluk, 2005, pp. 119–120).

Digital actions such as clicks or typing on a touchscreen can be understood from Aristotle's analysis of those actions. The clicking can be intentional or unintentional, so we can also use coercion and ignorance to judge digital actions. Coercion can make the perpetrator commit mixed actions, which are deliberate and, at the same time, unintentional actions. For this mixed action, Aristotle gave the following solution: to count it as intentional, that is, to avoid danger. Such actions are not precedence but must be carried out (Hardiman, 2021, p. 217). Such a compelling situation is rare for us to experience in digital communication. So, digital communication happens in our freedom and knowledge, not our ignorance. Aristotle gave the following example of ignorance: because of being attacked, a person hits his opponent in self-defense, but the person struck dies. The perpetrator did not intend to kill, but as a result, his opponent was dead. Aristotle gave an example of ignorance: someone says something about another, even though it is a secret. He did not know that what he said to others was a secret. From the two examples, the difference is clear: ignorance concerns a lack of information, while ignorance concerns the implementation of an intention whose impact is unexpected (Hardiman, 2021, p. 218).

In general, we can argue that just as every other action is always related to the perpetrator's character, the click is also associated with the character of the gadget user. Aristotle spoke of "decisions" as a mirror of character (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 130). Aristotle argued that, in a person's decision, "the precedence is most obvious and shows a judgment of character more than the actions" (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 153). Aristotle distinguished decisions from four things: desire, passion, desire, and opinion.

The ethics of digital communication is greatly helped by Aristotle's efforts to distinguish decisions from desires, passions, desires, and opinions. This is a functional normative approach to digital communication ethics. As moral beings, humans, or rather homo digitalizes, are faced with ethical choices in digital communication to realize good and avoid evil. However, in reality, Aristotle said, homo digitalizes are not entirely rational. Why? This is because there are desires, passions, desires, and opinions in him, often in the form of gossip, which is often difficult to distinguish from decisions. A common phenomenon in digital communication is not ignorance or coercion but thoughtlessness that makes clicking something banal (wrong but considered commonplace) and obscures the various distinctions that Aristotle has made above.

The digitization of actions has three effects. First, it is bodyless, meaning that the whole body, or even – if the interaction is between humans and machines – without a body does not need to be in action. This means that, behind one's online appearance, in the digital age, we cannot assume that a body is always accompanying it (Gunkel, 2016, p. 233). Second, action is a quick

movement that can precede decisions and is easily banalized, which is the process of superficializing the meaning where mistakes are considered commonplace. In digital communication, the speed of information change and the number of choices often come simultaneously before reflection. As a result, digital actions such as clicks can become routine, mundane actions and events and even turn into reflexes due to the scarcity of reflective pauses. Third, actions no longer on a person's body are also uprooted from a specific location. Actions undergo deterritorialization, that is, the process of decreasing actions from a particular location bond. Geographic location no longer determines the role, as the locus is connected anywhere globally in the digital world. The three, namely decorporealization, banalization, and deterritorialization of actions, have made actions fluid and anonymous (anonym) (Tillack, 2017). Facing these three actions, digital communication ethics must encourage user awareness to re-detail the fluid and rapid series of digital actions to their origins in consciousness so that digital communication ethics can reposition humans as tool users and arouse user awareness.

Banal action with fingers

From the description above, it can be seen how important it is to study banal actions with fingers. Banal's actions are learned from Hannah Arendt's thoughts, initially found in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963). Arendt's thesis: A Report on the Banality of Evil is a subtitle of the book. The importance of the study of banal actions to complement the survey conducted by Aristotle was also emphasized by Mary K. Swingle. Mary K. Swingle said that as gadget users, we are not only rational, and it appears in an adaptive attitude to the demands of the Internet. The Internet increasingly dominates people's perceptions and minds, so many people "need to act according to internet standards" (Swingle, 2016, p. 161). Therefore, the above Aristotelian analysis needs to be complemented by a study conducted by Hannah Arendt.

Arendt himself was a thinker whom Aristotle greatly influenced. In his book The Human Condition (1958), Arendt draws heavily on Aristotle's views on the relationship between action, virtue, and the polis in Nicomachean Ethics, particularly in his analysis of action. Meanwhile, Aristotle's analysis of intentionality and unintentionality gets a conceptual pairing in Arendt's book Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) about the banality of evil. Arendt's thesis, A Report on the Banality of Evil, is in the book's subtitles. Arendt's main points can be stated here as follows: A person will lose his ability to think and lose sensitivity to the reality of his crime if he is doing a routine crime with other people.

Given that digitality differs from corporate reality (Miner, 2002; Nahavandi, 2009), we need not rush to conclude that Arendt's analysis is entirely suitable for digital communication. The DE corporeal realization of actions in digital communication does not have to have consequences on the mindlessness that causes clicks to become banal. In corporate communication, lies, obscenity, and hatred are still felt by the perpetrator in their actions. Still, digital communication has lost its moral weight and turned into a strategy to increase viewers or likes.

Suppose Arendt argues that people can be selfish, cold-hearted, and ill-willed without caring about these things, and according to Arendt, that is the result of mindlessness. In that case, Yaacov Lozowick argues the opposite. According to Yaacov Lozowick, crime is "trained" as a rising career. Those trained are alpinists of crime, meaning they have an increasing crime (Lozowick, 2005). Arendt and Lozowick's views are not meaningful if we look at what happens in digital communication. Crime alpinism and crime banality in digital communication can work together to drive the crime industry in the digital space. Ordinary people like us who do not care about the digital environment and people who design hoaxes, pornography, and hate speech with malicious intent (Badaracco Jr, 1992; Badaracco et al., 1995; Baedowi, 2011) can "cooperate" with each other through the act of clicking banal to commit and spread crime on a global scale. When actions are digitally deterritorialized, the impact of those actions becomes unpredictable. Digital crime actors do not need to strive for technology and bureaucracy because ICT (Information and Communication Technology) systems have provided all that.

Digital communication ethics need to consider the conditions that Arendt warned about through his analysis because the ethical task is overcoming banal clicks. However, the transparency of users' data must be balanced by the openness of those who use it. As a result, transparency can be turned to them as supervision and control (Hardiman, 2021, p. 157). "The supervisory capitalists know anything about us, but their operations are designed to be unknowable to us" (Gray, 2019, p. 265)

How communication ethics deal with the ambivalence of digital technology

To find this way, the steps taken are to discuss a. digital technology dictatorship; b. how to deal with digital technology; c. Three Virtues for Digital Altruism.

Digital technology dictatorship

In addition to the banality of clicks, digital technology dictation is the biggest challenge of digital communication. The dictator's digital technology modifies continuous behavior by involving impersonal manipulators who are increasingly able to detail users' tastes, needs, dreams, thoughts, and perceptions. Here, our freedom is threatened because the intelligent machines that process information increasingly "know" who we are. He knows because we like to show off on social media.

Morals are irrelevant to machines because everything functions in computer algorithms. The impersonal digital technology system beyond good and evil is more effective and pervasive than any dictator (Alfes et al., 2017; Altheeb, 2020). Social media users have voluntarily surrendered themselves to scrutiny (Cummings et al., 2018; Hakkak et al., 2021). They also give their support through clicks. This is a challenge of digital communication ethics that must be by returning actions to the moral consciousness of users.

How to deal with digital technology

There are two possible ways to deal with dictatorial digital technology: the ha, rd way (in the sense of being firm, command promising) and the soft way. These two ways are to fight for and protect freedom in digital communication. First, brutal ways are carried out against the dictatorship of digital technology through protests or resistance. We must carry out a cyberpoets movement. This is done symbolically and technically by unliking, unfollowing, or unsubscribing in an organized manner. The first step of resistance must begin with identifying digital manipulators (trolls and political bots). The final step is to create new regulations on digital communication, which limit the space for manipulators to move. A more radical hard way is digital fasting. This method is done by deleting all accounts and apps that have manipulated our minds.

Second, the soft way. We will discuss this in more detail softly, but it is integrated into everyday life. This means reconnecting clicks with awareness to stop banality. For this reason, we need to learn back to Aristotle's view: how to be a priority netizen. Aristotle analyzed the relationship between actions, virtues, and character.

Here, the most crucial thing is internalization or habituation, not just habituation or habituation. Habituation cannot be separated from internalization because the two are related to each other, so virtues precipitate into a person's character and identity. Although awareness plays a vital role, the character can be considered the prime mover of the digital act or the backstage performer directing the stage actors. Actions without thought will degenerate into behavior (Henri & Donald, 1991; Motion et al., 2015). The decline is what Arendt calls banality. Thinking is possible with reflective pauses, stopping from the series of actions that form a routine. One way to fill that reflective gap is with the "Kantian categorical imperative in digital communication": Click on links as if your moral principles through your own will can become a universal rule in the digital universe. Reflective pauses are needed, at least, to realize that clicking is a moral act.

Three virtues for digital altruism

Courage, honesty, and self-control are three essential virtues for digital communication ethics, and we need to discuss them here. These three virtues build up what is called "digital altruism." First, the virtue of **courage**: The virtue of courage concerns risk-taking. The problem is that risks often must be realized when communicating with gadgets. The deterritorialization and decorporealization of actions often cause the direct impact of the message not to be felt. If the impact is not felt, then there is a tendency for the situation not to require courage from us gadget users. The courage in question is the moral courage to prove the truth and falsehood of a message. This is the same as courage in the field of journalism and academia.

In this context, thoughtful interventions into disinformation are called mesotes. The courage to intervene like that is called digital courage. In the era of digital technology, debunking is the embodiment of digital courage. Debunking is providing clear rebuttals and claims to information through the

results of a fact check. Debunking fake news and hate speech in the midst of an anonymous and rapid flow of information is a form of courage to abandon the role of a lurker and intervene in chat to improve communication.

Second is the priority of honesty. Courage alone is not enough. Honesty as a digital virtue is no longer as simple as honesty itself. Digital communication leads to transparency because various forms of crime can now be seen directly in the palm of your hand. This can all spark our enthusiasm and optimism in digital communication. Indeed, Hegelian's optimistic view says that human consciousness expresses itself outward and becomes outward in the digital world and will become transparent for all (Yu et al., 2018; Yukl, 2012).

The question is whether Hegelian optimism is authentic. The fact is that it is more complicated. In digital communication, transparency will never be total. New gaps will open. No "plain space" is free of secret places (Henri & Donald, 1991, p. 2008). Hoaxes and fake news are designed to be more powerful and sophisticated by experts so that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between facts and fake reality, even if there are videos, photos, or voices of perpetrators (Flynn et al., 1999; Pintelon et al., 2006). The honesty that we say turns into information, but as information, the words can be interpreted differently namely dishonesty. The problem is that the relationship between speech and information is uncertain, and it is that uncertainty that Luhmann thinks thwarts honesty (Hardiman, 2021, p. 11).

With his teachings on *the mesothes* (middle way), Aristotle placed honesty between deficit and excess, namely: to lie and brag. Dishonesty is no longer realized when a person routinely lies; That is one example of banality. In social media, bragging becomes a tactic to attract attention, and then bragging becomes a regular part of digital communication. There are many examples of how honest people's words are twisted on social media so that the meaning changes to lies. In digital communication, referring to Habermas' opinion, honesty is also a claim of validity that must be proven through communication (Hoon Hum, 2000; Jain et al., 2013).

Third, the priority of the judiciary. Arbitrariness, like courage, according to Aristotle's teachings, is a virtue that occupies the irrational part of man: his will and desire. Addiction is the right word for the absence of daily life. According to Aristotle's mesote, egalitarianism lies between the deficit of desire, namely insensibility, and the excess of desire, which is self-gratification (Pakaluk, 2005, p. 366) Epithumia or digital passion is related to two things, namely information technology and information content.

First, information technology itself is more than just a tool. The device as a tool remains under the user's control, but the user's thoughts and behaviors can be controlled and manipulated by smartphones and applications. These tools cause internet addiction, which can eliminate the off switch in the brain, making it difficult for people to calm down (Swingle, 2016, p. 39)

Second, materially, the content of digital communication can be an echo of human irrationality, for example, pornography, bullying, and hate speech. If this is not controlled, it will destroy the essence of communication itself. So, the

fortress of public common sense is agrarian, namely by maintaining the rational equilibrium of digital communication. The digital environment, in the future, will affect us even more. Digital technology tools will increasingly determine our lives (Purwanto, 2022). Digital technology makes precision, regularity, speed, and uniformity possible. Moreover, digital technology is very capable of automatism for almost everything.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the face of the ambivalence of digital technology, communication ethics puts digital actions back on the perpetrators' awareness. Keep in mind that the act of clicking is moral. Therefore, Aristotle's analysis of intentionality and inadvertence, ignorance and ignorance, and decisions and characters apply to the act of clicking. However, it should also be remembered that our moral consciousness is always too late to catch up with the overflow of information because of the disruption of the concept of action. In digital communication, actions become *fluid* and *anonymous* because they have been transformed by the decorporealization, banalization, and deterritorialization of actions so that the consciousness of moral actors is eroded by the rapidity, fluidity, and anonymity of their actions. Therefore, digital communication ethics must place digital actions back on the perpetrators' awareness. This task is not easy because it is precisely that awareness that is being eroded by the character of digital communication.

In addition, communication ethics overcomes banal clicks and confronts the robotic manipulators of digital systems. This is because the decorporealization and deterritorialization of actions, which are characters of digital communication, can lead to banal clicks, mainly if routine clicking actions cause the user's mindlessness. The moral sensitivity to missing clicks has placed users as free laborers of the digital crime industry, even if they are unaware of it themselves. Increasing (alpinist) and banal crime can work together to drive factories of lies, hatred, and obscenity beyond the moral consciousness of individuals. Therefore, communication ethics must overcome banal clicks and confront the robotic manipulators of digital systems.

Then, the way communication ethics deals with the ambivalence of digital technology is the hard way and the soft way, aiming to build digital altruism. The hard way is resistance to digital manipulators, while the soft way in digital communication is to re-place Aristotle's ethics, namely courage, honesty, and obedience. The three central virtues are to build digital altruism in digital communication ethics. The characteristics of digital communication, namely decorporealization, banalization, and deterritorialization of direct actions, challenge these three virtues. This does not cause problems because it is precisely because of these challenges that the three virtues of having quality are moral in the digital era. Victory over the challenge puts man as the master of the tools**.**

FURTHER STUDY

Follow-up studies can deepen understanding of how the principles of communication ethics can be applied to protect the privacy and security of individual data in an ever-evolving digital environment. This research may include investigating technologies and best practices for protecting personal data from threats such as hacking and misuse, and examining the privacy policies implemented by technology companies and how they can be aligned with the principles of communication ethics.

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