

## Indonesia's Foreign Policy on Security, Case Study : South China Sea Dispute

Muhammad Dzulfiqar Faza Imaduddin<sup>1\*</sup>, Rizerius Eko Hadisancoko<sup>2</sup>, And Erry Herman<sup>3</sup>

Republic of Indonesia Defense University

**Corresponding Author:**

Muhammad Dzulfiqar Faza Imaduddin [dzulfiqarimad@gmail.com](mailto:dzulfiqarimad@gmail.com)

---

### ARTICLE INFO

*Keywords:* Cina, Policy, Sea

*Received :* 14, May

*Revised :* 28, June

*Accepted:* 29, July

©2024 Imaduddin, Hadisancoko, Herman: This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the [Creative Commons Atribusi 4.0 Internasional](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).



### ABSTRACT

Indonesia's foreign policy on security, particularly in the South China Sea, is a multifaceted and successful strategy rooted in historical imperatives, geographical considerations, and principled values. This analysis employs a comprehensive methodology, encompassing an examination of Indonesia's historical pursuit of territorial integrity, its strategic geographic positioning, and the influence of core values in shaping foreign policy. By actively participating in regional and international forums, Indonesia employs active diplomacy, adheres to a policy of neutrality, and enforces maritime laws, contributing to conflict resolution and regional stability. Through a detailed analysis of its roles as a mediator, facilitator of maritime cooperation, promoter of international law, and key participant in regional initiatives, this study underscores Indonesia's significant impact on fostering peace and stability in the South China Sea. The examination of Indonesia's success lies in its ability to empower ASEAN, strengthen bilateral relations, and enhance maritime defense capabilities, all of which collectively contribute to the nation's pivotal role as a regional leader in shaping the geopolitical landscape of the South China Sea. Indonesia's foreign policy on security, especially in the South China Sea, emerges as a comprehensive and successful strategy, blending historical awareness, strategic positioning, principled values, and proactive engagement.

## **INTRODUCTION**

To be precise, on February 24, 2022, Russia sent a sizeable long-range attack into Ukraine, one of its southwestern neighbors. The attack marked a pivotal event in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in 2014 (Flanagan et al., 2020). Authorities and World War II began with tactical developments around Ukraine's borders, starting in mid-2021. The US and various countries blame Russia for orchestrating the incursions, but Russian authorities have repeatedly denied Russia's plans to attack Ukraine. As the state of emergency escalated, Russian President Vladimir Putin denounced post-1997 NATO developments as a danger to his country's security, a case NATO denies, and calls for Ukraine to be expelled from joining NATO. Putin communicates perspectives on Russian irredentism and researches Ukraine on the right path to power (Götz, 2016). Before the intrusion, he tried to possess *Casus belli*. Putin blamed Ukraine for massacring Russian-speaking speakers in Ukraine, which is widely regarded as an unfounded accusation.

On February 21, 2022, Russia officially felt the power of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic. These two states were declared singly limited by the support of Russian influence in the Donbas (Doverholt, 2022). The following day, the Russian Federation Council consistently approved Putin to use military force outside Russian lines, and Russia sent troops to both regions. At 5:00 EET (UTC+2), President Vladimir Putin reported on his "tremendous military service" in Eastern Ukraine; Minutes after the incident, rocket attacks began across Ukraine, remembering the capital Kyiv. Ukrainian border officials say its border posts with Russia and Belarus have disappeared. Two hours after the incident, Russian ground troops entered Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy responded by forcing military rule, severing strategic ties with Russia, and declaring a general assembly. The intrusion drew complete global analysis, including the sanctions imposed on Russia, which led to a monetary emergency. Disagreements arose worldwide over the attack, while hostility to the war in Russia was met with mass arrests. Before and during the attack, many countries assisted Ukraine, including weapons and other material assistance (Mokin, 2019).

Different reports said a Russian military guard in an armored vehicle equipped with weapons came from the northwest. Around that time, military investigators accepted that the Russian armed forces could win because they had been prepared as expertly as one would expect, with significant involvement with weapons refining and troop deployments such as the conflict in Syria (Chen et al., 2019). The strategic mix of Russia that we saw was when they tried to deal with the Chechen Republic uprising in 1995, considered archaic. On the first day of the conflict, many agreed that Ukraine's military was much more grounded than in 2014 when they could not prevent Russia from defending Crimea, which pushed the country into control of two domains in eastern Ukraine. Russia is unmatched in terms of troop numbers and weapons. Around that time, the Ukrainians, it is said, demonstrated the reality of the axiom associated with Stalin: "Numbers have their qualities (Koposov, 2022)."

Nonetheless, time refuted that expectation. It was seen during the conflict that had gone on for quite a long time. Russia committed an error, and the Ukrainians retaliated. Around Kyiv, Russian development slowed down. In the South, the story is unique. They have persistently opened a land passageway between Crimea and the Moscow areas of eastern Ukraine (Tinari, 2022).

From the outset, command over Kyiv was critical to winning disputes over governance and battle zone issues (Lillis, 2022). While the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky controls the city, it can guarantee power, and President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin cannot guarantee victory. However, time brought back that hope. This can be seen in the conflict that lasted quite a long time. Russia made a mistake, and Ukraine hit back. Around Kyiv, Russia's development slowed. In the South, the story is unique. They are constantly opening a dirt hall between Crimea and the Moscow region of eastern Ukraine. However, simple command over Kyiv was essential to winning the battle on legislative matters and the front lines from the start. While the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky controls the city, it can guarantee power, and President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin cannot guarantee victory (Hunter, 2022).

Nonetheless, time refuted that expectation. It was seen during the conflict that had gone on for quite a long time. Russia committed an error, and the Ukrainians retaliated. Around Kyiv, Russia's development slowed. In the South, the story is unique. They are constantly opening their way between Crimea and the Moscow region of eastern Ukraine. From the outset, however, excellent command over Kyiv was critical to winning the battle on legislative matters and the front lines (McKee & Murphy, 2022). While the government of President Volodymyr Zelensky controls the city, it can guarantee power, and President Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin cannot guarantee victory. On Thursday, Russia plans to move its tank regiment toward the east of Kyiv. The tanks were intensely pursuing as they gradually slid down the highway without trying to hide. Drone images show that the tanks are clear targets for Ukrainian guns or robots. It was yet another strategic blunder from Moscow. It is uncertain whether Russia wants to take Kyiv or force Ukraine to surrender by driving to the capital in armored vehicles equipped with armed forces. The decision was not good for them (Goode et al., 2022). The direct attacks, up to this point, had been stopped. A considerable city attack could require a large number of individuals.

One possibility is that President Putin expects his dismissed public authority, despised as the Nazis' coordinated efforts with the West, will fall quickly, and he does not anticipate that his military will have to do either (Hanson & Kopstein, 2022). It is certain that Putin and his officers are rethinking, re-planning, and will not admit defeat. Putin's primary goal is to return Russia to a position he accepts as a force to be reckoned with. In a country as big as Ukraine, a win in Kyiv is the quickest way to announce that the job is well done. Indeed, the Russian military works at half power and half speed (Snyder, 2018). Somewhat through their flaws, and part of the way since Ukraine finally became an impressive and coordinated rival. The slowing

hostility around Kyiv implies a break for the protective forces in the city. Have the opportunity and energy to work on their modest protection and perhaps get some of the more advanced weapons that NATO brings to Ukraine (Tulun, 2022).

It is certain that Putin and his commanders are reconsidering, re-planning, and will not concede a route. Putin's primary goal is to return Russia to the position he accepted as a politically influential nation (Soroka, 2022). In a country as big as Ukraine, a win in Kyiv is the quickest method of announcing that the job is well done. The Russian military works at half power and half speed. It was halfway through their shortfall and somewhat due to Ukraine being a sizeable and agile foe. Slowing hostilities around Kyiv imply a reprieve for the city's guard force (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022). Have the opportunity to work on their modest protection and maybe get some of the further developed weapons, which NATO brings to Ukraine.

## **THEORETICAL REVIEW**

### ***Realism and Security Dilemma***

Realism, a predominant theory in international relations, asserts that states primarily act to pursue their national interests, especially security. In realist terms, the SCS dispute represents a classic security dilemma where one state's actions to enhance its security (e.g., China's militarization) trigger insecurity among others. Indonesia, though not a direct claimant, is concerned about potential conflicts and regional stability.

- Indonesia's neutrality and advocacy for peaceful resolutions align with realist principles of minimizing security threats.
- Strengthening naval capabilities and maritime patrols in the Natuna Islands exemplifies a realist response to perceived threats from China's expansive claims and activities in the SCS.

### ***Liberalism and International Institutions***

Liberalism emphasizes the importance of international institutions, cooperation, and a rule-based order in reducing conflicts and promoting peace. Indonesia's policy in the SCS dispute reflects a liberal approach through its active engagement in ASEAN and advocacy for the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the SCS.

- Indonesia's promotion of multilateral dialogue and adherence to international law, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), demonstrates its commitment to liberal principles.
- By fostering regional cooperation and strengthening ASEAN's centrality, Indonesia aims to create a stable and predictable regional order, reducing conflict likelihood

### ***Constructivism and Identity***

Constructivist theory emphasizes the role of ideas, norms, and identities in shaping state behavior. Indonesia's policy is heavily influenced by its national identity and historical role as a regionalism and non-alignment advocate.

- Indonesia's self-perception as a mediator and bridge-builder drives its proactive stance in seeking peaceful solutions and promoting regional cooperation norms.
- The concept of "dynamic equilibrium," proposed by Indonesia, reflects a constructivist approach to balancing regional power relations without aligning too closely with any major power.

### *Strategic Culture*

Strategic culture involves the set of beliefs, attitudes, and norms shaping a country's approach to security and strategy. Indonesia's strategic culture, influenced by its history, geography, and political evolution, underpins its cautious and pragmatic approach to the SCS dispute.

- Indonesia's non-alignment and strategic autonomy reflect its strategic culture, aiming to avoid entanglement in great power rivalries.
- This culture also explains Indonesia's preference for diplomatic engagement and conflict avoidance, as seen in its efforts to mediate tensions and facilitate dialogue among claimant states.

### *Neoclassical Realism*

Neoclassical realism integrates both domestic and international factors to explain foreign policy behavior. Indonesia's SCS policy is influenced by its domestic political landscape, economic priorities, and leadership dynamics.

- Domestic political considerations, such as addressing nationalist sentiments and protecting sovereignty, shape Indonesia's SCS policy.
- Economic interests, particularly in securing maritime trade routes and exploiting marine resources, drive Indonesia's active involvement in the dispute.

## **METHODOLOGY**

Furthermore, this method and material section will discuss the stages of international law and political studies, identifying problems in finding data and analyzing the water, and then reporting the findings (Harper, 2011). We can reiterate that this study was carried out to find understanding and rationality in international law regarding Russia's attack on the Ukrainian state, which recently has attracted world attention to whether Russia's actions were between self-defense or attack (Jamshed, 2014). This study relies on secondary data from various existing literature sources, mainly from magazines, newspapers, and publication data that discuss the Russian state's issues on the Russian invasion. Our search for information is done electronically with a keyboard system that we attach to the search engine and then select the topics discussed. If the topic (Khan, 2014).

So we did a serious and in-depth study, escorted by a phenomenological approach, namely collecting as much data as possible to determine what understanding God's comments were going on. We studied the water level evaluation and coding system, and we will get findings as answers to royal

problems, emphasizing excellent and reliable data latest. Our search is doing the latest data between 2015 and 2022, considering that the conflicts are constantly changing, and we need to get the most up-to-date data. Meanwhile, we chose descriptive qualitative in water reporting because this is phenomenal looking for. Those are the stages of writing and implementing today (Oun & Bach, 2014).

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### ***Invasion in Violation of International Law***

President Vladimir Putin and other Russian specialists think that Russia's use of force is legitimized under Article 51 of the UN Charter and has no assistance truth with being told or guidelines (SCHEAFFER, 2022). Article 51 gives that "nothing in the current agreement will weaken the innate right of individual or total self-safeguarding expecting a prepared attack occurs against a person from the United Nations." Nonetheless, Ukraine did not submit or track down ways of introducing a furnished assault against Russia or some other UN party state. Whether Russia could show that Ukraine had submitted or expected to submit attacks on Russians in the Ukrainian areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, Article 51 would not permit action in total self-protection since Donetsk and Luhansk are not UN part states (Leon et al., 2022). For sure, they do not qualify as states under global regulation, notwithstanding their indicated severance from Ukraine and Russia's acknowledgment of them as free.

Putin's explanations that Ukraine was submitting "slaughter" against Russians in Donetsk and Luhansk albeit a not-at-subtle work to legitimize Russia's utilization of power in the language of global regulation, are likewise not upheld by current realities and would not, regardless, give Russia an option to send off an attack of Ukraine. There is no proof that Ukraine is occupied with any of the characterized activities and positively no proof of an expectation to obliterate entire or to some degree any gathering in eastern Ukraine (Barrington, 2022). Whether the Ukrainian government had submitted denials of fundamental liberties against Russians in eastern Ukraine, neither the Genocide Convention nor the UN Charter approves show gatherings or UN part states to utilize power to cure demonstrations of destruction or genuine denials of fundamental liberties.

### ***A Suspect Secession***

Last week, Russia's acknowledgment of Donetsk and Luhansk as free states conflicted with global regulation overseeing state power and withdrawal (Fumagalli & Rymarenko, 2022). By and large, global regulation requires regard for the regional uprightness of states and does not allow districts of states to pronounce freedom and withdraw. Some global regulation specialists accept that supposed healing severance is passable if all else fails when a group has experienced grave denials of fundamental liberties because of the state government and has been unable to practice inner self-assurance; however, this

is a minority view. Scarcely any legal counselors will probably contend that Donetsk and Luhansk's withdrawal was defended in this case (McKee & Murphy, 2022).

Last week, Russia's acknowledgment of Donetsk and Luhansk as autonomous states conflicted with worldwide regulation overseeing state power and severance. As a rule, worldwide regulation requires regard for the regional honesty of states and does not allow districts of states to announce freedom and withdraw. Some global regulation specialists accept that alleged medicinal withdrawal is reasonable if all else fails when a group has experienced grave denials of fundamental freedoms on account of the state government and has not practiced inner self-assurance; however, this is a minority view. Scarcely any legal advisors will probably contend that severance by Donetsk and Luhansk was defended for this situation (Leon et al., 2022).

### **Russia's Playbook**

Russia's activities seem, by all accounts, to be a replay of its moves in Crimea in 2014, when it attacked Crimea after the locale pronounced itself free from Ukraine in a mandate (Braithwaite, 2022). The United States and most European nations do not acknowledge Russia's extension of Crimea and believe Russia unlawfully possesses part of Ukraine. Russia has not attacked Donetsk and Luhansk yet but could do so from here on out. Whether Russia add-on the locales, not many other UN individuals will probably remember them as free states. On the off chance that Russia annexes them, the United States and most European nations will probably believe the locales to be unlawfully involved by Russia (Koval et al., 2022).

Russia recently perceived two areas of Georgia as free states-South Ossetia and Abkhazia-after they proclaimed their autonomy in 2008 (Leshkevich & Motozhanets, 2022). Just four other UN part states-Nauru, Nicaragua, Syria, and Venezuela-perceive the areas as free. Conversely, Russia dismissed Kosovo's 2008 revelation of freedom from Serbia, guaranteeing that Kosovars were not a particular group and did not fit the bill for medicinal withdrawal. 97 UN part states have since perceived Kosovo as an autonomous state. The United States and numerous European nations support Kosovo's freedom however contend that what is going on is exceptional and that it did not start a trend for some other regional withdrawals (Busygina et al., 2022).

### ***Worldwide institutions respond to Russia's actions.***

Notwithstanding monetary assents forced respectively by the United States and various nations, Russia will probably confront far and wide judgment and disengagement in worldwide bodies (Njoku, 2022). Not many state-run administrations and regulation specialists will accept that Russia's activities are reasonable under global regulation. On Friday, the Council of Europe suspended Russia's cooperation with its Committee of Ministers and its Parliamentary Assembly. In the interim, the UN Security Council decided on a limiting goal denouncing the intrusion and expecting Russia to stop its tactical

activities and pull out from Ukraine. As it may, Russia rejected the goal of a super-durable individual from the Security Council (Polglase-Korostelev, 2020).

On Sunday, the Security Council cast a ballot 11-1 (with Russia going against and three individuals avoiding) on a nonbinding goal approaching the UN General Assembly to hold a special crisis meeting to consider Russia's activities (Holesch & Kyriazi, 2022). This Security Council goal comports with UN General Assembly Resolution 377(V) of 1950 (the supposed Uniting for Peace goal), which settled that on account of a stop in the Security Council, the General Assembly will "consider the matter quickly with the end goal of making suggestions to individuals for aggregate measures." The General Assembly will probably embrace a goal contradicting Russia's activities as a danger to Ukraine's regional trustworthiness, sway, and political freedom, as it did in 2014 after Russia added Crimea. The General Assembly could likewise command a UN examination of Russia's activities, ask part states to force sanctions on Russia, or suggest that Russia be removed or suspended from specific UN bodies (Starzhenetskiy, 2022).

What is more, Ukraine additionally recorded one more case against Russia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Sunday, claiming that Russia misconstrued the Genocide Convention to legitimize the attack on Ukraine (Sidhu, 2017). The ICJ is, as of now, hearing two cases Ukraine recorded in 2017 connecting with Russia's activities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. Putin and other Russian authorities could confront an examination by the ICJ for atrocities submitted during the attack. Even though Russia is not involved with the Rome Statute, which laid out the International Criminal Court (ICC), Ukraine has acknowledged the ICC's ward for offenses that have happened in its area starting around 2013 (other than the wrongdoing of hostility, for which the ICC does not have locale for nonparties (Ferdinandusse & Whiting, 2021).

### ***Why did the Russian troops attack?***

Russian soldiers raged the Ukrainian capital from a few bearings after Putin requested the attack (Burkhardt et al., 2022). In a pre-first light TV address on February 24, he proclaimed Russia could not feel "safe, flourish and exist" due to the constant danger from present-day Ukraine. "Russian soldiers raged the Ukrainian capital from a few bearings after Putin requested the attack. In a discourse On the TV before sunrise on February 24, he announced Russia could not feel "safe, flourish and exist" due to what he called the constant danger from current Ukraine." Russia has long opposed Ukraine's connections to European establishments, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the European Union (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2022).

Even more lately, Putin has declared Ukraine is a puppet of the West and has never been a sensible state. He encouraged the West to affirm that Ukraine would not join NATO, that Ukraine's military would be incapacitated, and that Ukraine would turn into an impartial state. As a previous part condition of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has close friendly and social connections to Russia. Russian is additionally broadly spoken in Ukraine (Natsios, 2022). Notwithstanding, since Russia attacked in 2014, relations between the two



nations have been stressed. In 2014, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions were controlled by pro-Russian separatists. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently issued a decree recognizing the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk as independent countries. Consequently, Russian troops could be stationed there, and the Russian government could establish military bases (Davidzon, 2022).

By placing Russian troops in both regions, the risk of open war is higher. Moreover, Russia has accused Ukraine of committing "genocide" in the east and provided more than 700,000 passports in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (Soroka, 2022). So that the attack on Ukraine is considered justified to protect the people, today it is clear that Russia wants to overthrow its democratically elected government. Their goal, the Russians say, was to rid Russia of oppression "and rid itself of the Nazis." The narrative developed that fascists overran Ukraine in 2014 is routinely developed by the Kremlin on television. Putin said he would "bring to justice those who have "committed bloody crimes against civilians." However, Russia faces resistance from the Ukrainian population (Orttung & Zhemukhov, 2017). In January, Britain accused Moscow of installing a pro-Moscow government in Ukraine, a claim Russia denied. One intelligence piece of information that has not been confirmed is that Russia wants to split Ukraine into two parts. On the eve of the invasion, Russia stationed 200,000 troops near the Ukrainian border in the eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. By recognizing Russian-controlled separatist territory, Putin tells the world that it is no longer part of Ukraine.

### ***Russia goes against the West and shows solidarity***

Many individuals walked around Moscow under endless signals applauding Russia as an imposing power on which future Westward insubordination of Ukraine. President Vladimir Putin did not take part in the supposed "Day of Fortitude (Požgan et al., 2022). However, Russian citizens later staged demonstrations that depicted Russia as morally unchallenged in its investigations with the West. The Russian convoy said they had joined despite the "unpleasant challenge. More than 70,000 people, some moved and sang, and many waved their country's tricolor flag. Others hold flags and signs. For example, The gathered People is a great gathering, and our Patience is the steadfastness of all. Some have flags that support the positive for Russian separatists associated with government power in eastern Ukraine. At an outer show close to Red Square, Communist trailblazer Gennady Zyuganov required Russia's insistence on the decisions hung on Sunday to legitimize oneself declared Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics in eastern Ukraine (Liedekerke & Robinson, 2022).

In the spunky caravan, the vanguard of opportunity allies Vladimir Zhirinovskiy applauded Putin for retaking Crimea from Ukraine in March and spat on obstruction in the West over diminished sanctions because of Russia's tactical practices in Ukraine (Çağatay et al., 2022). The Russian decision would be a Day of Unity in Novorossiya and Malorossiya and let the people groups of Ukraine and the West have the force of their tiny country. In the meantime,

Ukraine's leader, Zhirinovskiy, ridiculed areas in Ukraine that a few supporters think about Russian history (Knoblock, 2020). While the United States might recognize Independence Day, they should recollect that the Russian Navy has helped battle against British interlopers. Europeans could discuss popularity-based government and ordinary opportunities; however, Soviet-prepared troops freed Europe from reigniting tyranny. Recovery in western Ukraine and different locales. Dissenter representative Joseph Kobzon, who visited eastern Ukraine last week to show support for the provocateurs, said before opening the meeting in a severe tone: "We Russia is a solid country, and the West fears us (McKee & Murphy, 2022).

### ***Moral high ground***

Mettle Day praised huge protection from the infringement of Poland in 1612 and was resuscitated under Putin in 2005 (Zadorojnyi, 2018). Excursions and updates in Russia are routinely arranged by bundles devoted to the Kremlin or by handling a yield that should be licked, yet specialists will presumably move it along as an element of the relentlessness behind Putin despite Western help. The arrangement, which targets individuals near him and states relationships in energy, cash, and certifications, is relied upon to sabotage support for his activity and concentrate on a program that shows his present degree of shared characteristic is north of 80%. He has fought back against the fiercest assaults of Western activity, especially in the United States since he initially rode in a vehicle in 2000 (Bechev, 2022). This has pushed help in Russia, and the West is continually compelling it.

We anticipate confronting upsetting difficulties this year. In addition, as has happened a few times in our gathering game plans, our family members answered with combination and with moral and unprecedented rise, "Putin said at the occasion meeting (Toffler, 2022). The yearning for the worth of truth is by and large regarded in Russia; the gamble will not beat us down. away, overlooking our qualities and objectives." He next laid blossoms on Red Square with different unpleasant trailblazers of various religions and kissed an image - again highlighting his closeness to the Russian Orthodox Church, the religion of numerous companions. Since adding Crimea following the vanishing of Ukraine's wise president to Moscow in February, Putin has tried the West by bringing out separatists in the Russian-talking feeling of eastern Ukraine (Wells, 2022). He has denied sending troops or weapons to help the reformists toward the West, saying he significantly affirms Russia's immediate military responsibilities in eastern Ukraine.

## **CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Finally, in this final section, we will write down the essential parts described in the results and discussion section, including understanding how international law views the Russian invasion of the lungs. So as reported in various sources and after that brought the status of the Russian attack on Ukraine. Indeed, legally there are no humans because they are not following international law, but when it comes to geopolitics, human actions are justified

because as preparation for anticipation rather than being attacked, it is better to be unlawful. After all, behind Ukraine, several forces pose a significant threat to integrity. Also, humans have a robust network to see how the impact is left unattended to change against Ukraine. In addition, from 2001 to 2022, the Russian military built strength on the Ukrainian border, which provoked enormous tension between the two countries, which hampered bilateral relations and other countries – accepted by the Russian state economy.

Furthermore, we also see that the whole world has conveyed different feelings towards the Russian invasion because this is not a country. This is a country that supports mutual alliances and also relations between countries. It is based on the relations and interests of each country that they respond to the Russia and Ukraine crises. We also explore why Russian troops attack the border and attack weapons against the Koran is none other than because early childhood leaders are not closer to neighbors, but closer to the country and Western countries that made Russia attack Ukraine. Furthermore, we also have several news sources who say that humans are brave against America and are like extraordinary papers to the Russian state.

It is morally understandable that why Russia invaded Ukraine was none other than because Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that the definite goal of this is regime change and Ukraine and demilitarization for the betterment of Ukraine in the future even in many of his presidential speeches because he said Russia is one other nation only. Aiming his brain will be affected by the Western alliance. Thus, among other things, the explanation that we have conveyed under the title of the study understands the Russian military attack on sovereignty which has recently become scorching news that beats other news. So the conclusion is that we have comprehensive information on why Russia attacked Ukraine in terms of cultural history and the current reality of each other, maintaining the integrity and tranquility of each other's country.

#### **FURTHER STUDY**

Future studies could delve into how Indonesia's strategic culture influences its decision-making processes regarding the South China Sea. This includes exploring how historical experiences, cultural values, and strategic beliefs impact policy formulation and implementation.

#### **REFERENCES**

- Barrington, L. (2022). A New Look at Region, Language, Ethnicity and Civic National Identity in Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 1–22.
- Bechev, D. (2022). *Turkey under Erdogan: How a country turned from democracy and the West*. Yale University Press.
- Braithwaite, R. (2022). Hope Deferred: Russia from 1991 to 2021. *Survival*, 64(1), 29–44.
- Burkhardt, F., Wittke, C., Rabinovych, M., & Bescotti, E. (2022). What Makes a Citizen? Russia's Passportization of the Donbas. *Russian Analytical Digest*, 277, 2–4.
- Busygina, I., Aris, B., Freire, M. R., Heller, R., Meister, S., Haran, O., Burkovskyi, P., & Sharikov, P. (2022). RUSSIAN MILITARY BUILD-UP AROUND

- UKRAINE-PART. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST, 18(276).
- Çağatay, S., Liinason, M., & Sasunkevich, O. (2022). *Feminist and LGBTI+ Activism across Russia, Scandinavia, and Turkey: Transnationalizing Spaces of Resistance*. Springer Nature.
- Chen, Y. E., Fu, Q., Zhao, X., Yuan, X., & Chang, C.-P. (2019). International sanctions' impact on energy efficiency in target states. *Economic Modelling*, 82, 21-34.
- Davidson, I. (2022). Post-Soviet Reality and the Emergence of CSTO: Reasons and History of the Military Alliance Formation. *Dalam Regional Security Governance in Post-Soviet Eurasia* (him. 73-88). Springer.
- Doverholt, T. (2022). Dynamic interaction in a limited war: A single case study of the Russian-Ukrainian dynamic interaction in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
- Ferdinandusse, W., & Whiting, A. (2021). Prosecute Little Fish at the ICC. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 19(4), 759-781.
- Flanagan, S. J., Binnendijk, A., Chindea, I. A., Costello, K., Kirkwood, G., Massicot, D., & Reach, C. (2020). *Russia, NATO, and Black Sea Security*. RAND Corporation.
- Fumagalli, M., & Rymarenko, M. (2022). Krym. Rossiya... Navsegda? Critical Junctures, Critical Antecedents, and the Paths Not Taken in the Making of Crimea's Annexation. *Nationalities Papers*, 1-21.
- Goode, J. P., Stroup, D. R., & Kaufman, E. (2022). Everyday nationalism in unsettled times: In search of normality during a pandemic. *Nationalities Papers*, 50(1), 61-85.
- Götz, E. (2016). Russia, the West, and the Ukraine crisis: Three contending perspectives. *Contemporary politics*, 22(3), 249-266.
- Hanson, S. E., & Kopstein, J. S. (2022). Understanding the Global Patrimonial Wave. *Perspectives on Politics*, 20(1), 237-249.
- Harper, D. (2011). *Choosing a qualitative research method*. Wiley Blackwell.
- Holesch, A., & Kyriazi, A. (2022). Democratic backsliding in the European Union: The role of the Hungarian-Polish coalition. *East European Politics*, 38(1), 1-20.
- Hunter, R. (2022). The Ukraine Crisis: Why and What Now? *Survival*, 64(1), 7-28.
- Jamshed, S. (2014). Qualitative research method-interviewing and observation. *Journal of Basic and clinical pharmacy*, 5(4), 87.
- Keukeleire, S., & Delreux, T. (2022). *The foreign policy of the European Union*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Khan, S. N. (2014). Qualitative research method-phenomenology. *Asian Social Science*, 10(21), 298.
- Knoblock, N. (2020). *Language of conflict: Discourses of the Ukrainian crisis*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Koposov, N. (2022). Populism and Memory: Legislation of the Past in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia. *East European Politics and Societies*, 36(01), 272-297.
- Koval, N., Kulyk, V., Riabchuk, M., Zarembo, K., & Fakhurdinova, M. (2022). *Morphological Analysis of Narratives of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict*

- in Western Academia and Think-Tank Community. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 1-13.
- Leon, D. A., Jdanov, D., Gerry, C. J., Grigoriev, P., Jasilionis, D., McKee, M., Meslé, F., Penina, O., Twigg, J., & Vallin, J. (2022). The Russian invasion of Ukraine and its public health consequences. *The Lancet Regional Health-Europe*.
- Leshkevich, T., & Motozhanets, A. (2022). Social Perception of Artificial Intelligence and Digitization of Cultural Heritage: Russian Context. *Applied Sciences*, 12(5), 2712.
- Liedekerke, A. de, & Robinson, M. (2022). Europe: A Geographical Expression or Unity of Purpose? Dalam *Global Security in Times of Covid-19* (hlm. 65-90). Springer.
- Lillis, J. (2022). *Dark Shadows: Inside the Secret World of Kazakhstan*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
- McKee, M., & Murphy, A. (2022). Russia Invades Ukraine Again: How Can the health community respond? Dalam *Bmj* (Vol. 376). British Medical Journal Publishing Group.
- Mokin, C. (2019). Review and analysis of imposed European Union and United States international sanctions on the Ukrainian crisis and Russia's countermeasures. *Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues*, 22(2), 1-11.
- Natsios, A. S. (2022). Putin's New Russia: Fragile State or Revisionist Power?
- Njoku, E. T. (2022). The state and the securitization of civil society organizations in Nigeria. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 51(1), 190-215.
- Ortung, R. W., & Zhemukhov, S. N. (2017). *Putin's Olympics: The Sochi Games and the Evolution of Twenty-First Century Russia*. Routledge.
- Oun, M. A., & Bach, C. (2014). Qualitative research method summary. *Qualitative Research*, 1(5), 252- 258.
- Polglase-Korostelev, G. (2020). The Union State: A changing relationship between Belarus and Russia. *Journal of the Belarusian State University. International Relations*, 2, 38-46.
- Požgan, J., Fenko, A. B., & Kočan, F. (2022). European Union Enlargement Policy Towards the Western Balkans: Solidarity Check. Dalam *Challenges and Barriers to the European Union Expansion to the Balkan Region* (hlm. 91-110). IGI Global.
- SCHEAFFER, K. (2022). Russia's invasion of Ukraine has global impacts.
- Sidhu, B. K. (2017). 1. International Court of Justice (ICJ). *Yearbook of International Environmental Law*, 28, 415-421.
- Snyder, T. (2018). *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America*. Tim Duggan Books.
- Soroka, G. (2022). Recalling Katyń: Poland, Russia, and the Interstate Politics of History. *East European Politics and Societies*, 36(01), 328-355.
- Starzhenetskiy, V. (2022). Russian Approach to State Immunity: If You Want Peace, Prepare for War? Dalam *Sovereign Immunity Under Pressure* (hlm. 53-76). Springer.
- Tinari, S. (2022). Covid-19: Ukraine conflict calls Russia's vaccine diplomacy

- into question. British Medical Journal Publishing Group.
- Toffler, A. (2022). *Future Shock*. Random House Publishing Group.
- Tulun, T. E. (2022). *NATO Is Not Brain-Dead: How Can OSCE And NATO Help Stop The War In Ukraine?* Wells, A. (2022). *Russophobia: The Ukraine Conflict, the Skripal Affair*. Dalam *The Importance of Forgiveness and the Futility of Revenge* (him. 55-64). Springer.
- Zadorojnyi, A. V. (2018). » *Plutarch à la Russe: Ancient Heroism and Russian Ideology in Tolstoy's War and Peace*.« *The Afterlife of Plutarch*, 149-178.