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Gamification in Gig Economy for Ride-Hailing Drivers in Medan

Shalsabilla Shafira[1*], Ritha F. Dalimunthe[2], R. Hamdani Harahap[3]
Universitas Sumatera Utara
Corresponding Author: Shalsabilla Shafira: shalsabillashafira@students.usu.ac.id

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ABSTRACT
Gamification has become a key strategy used by ride-hailing platforms to regulate and control drivers' behavior through elements such as missions, points, levels, performance, ratings, challenges, and rewards, all designed to increase drivers' engagement in their work. This study explores how gamification mechanisms shape the working conditions of Gojek and Grab drivers in Medan. The research used a qualitative design with an interpretivist phenomenological approach, drawing on in-depth interviews with 16 ride-hailing drivers. The data were analyzed using Nvivo12 software. The findings reveal that the gamification system implemented by the platforms creates an unequal power relationship between companies and drivers. The platforms hold substantial control over work processes and access to missions, which affects drivers' income. Out of the four decent work indicators, only one is fulfilled: the provision of clear job information through the application. In contrast, drivers' earnings are unstable and remain below the Regional Minimum Wage due to the gig nature of the work and gamification mechanisms that privilege drivers with higher account levels. Moreover, drivers must work very long hours, on average 14 hours per day and face unsafe working environments, particularly the threat of criminal assaults in Medan. These findings emphasize the importance of state involvement in formulating regulations to eliminate the vulnerability of ride-hailing drivers, which is further exacerbated by unilateral gamification mechanisms and unequal power relations between platforms and workers.

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INTRODUCTION

The development of digital technology has created an increasingly connected work environment, driving the growth of platform-based work to become more common. De Stefano (2016) calls this work crowd-work, which is when companies and workers are connected by online platforms. In the labor market, the emergence of the gig economy is a symbol of a major shift in the world of work, where flexibility is a major attraction for many workers (Zhen et al., 2019). This change requires workers and companies to adapt to a more flexible and technology-based work model.

Globally, the gig economy market is estimated to reach USD 455 billion by 2023, with an annual growth rate of 17% (Statista, 2023). In Indonesia, this condition is reinforced by the high proportion of informal sector workers, which is 59.17% of total workers as of February 2024 (BPS, 2024). Informal jobs, such as ride-hailing drivers, are often the main choice because of their flexibility and quick access to income even without the guarantee of permanent employment (Kamim & Khandiq, 2019).

One concrete form of the gig economy is online transportation platforms such as Go-jek and Grab. Although they offer flexibility, gig workers, especially ride-hailing drivers, face pressure to achieve work targets and maintain performance amidst minimal job protection. To maintain productivity, these platforms implement a gamification system, namely the integration of game elements into the work context (Khoshnoodifar et al., 2023). Elements such as levels, missions, and incentives are designed to motivate drivers to continue working.

Several studies have shown that gamification can increase work engagement and solidarity (Behl et al., 2021; Popan et al., 2023). However, other findings show that gamification creates high work pressure, the illusion of freedom, and even encourages drivers to cheat (Wicaksono, 2020; Hidajat et al., 2021; Asih et al., 2022; Krijger, 2019). This pressure can have an impact on physical and mental health, especially for drivers in big cities with high crime rates such as Medan, which recorded 13.5% of the total national crime cases (Polri, 2022).

To date, studies on the impact of gamification on ride-hailing drivers are still focused on big cities in Java, such as Jakarta and Surabaya. In fact, cities outside Java, such as Medan, have social, economic, and cultural characteristics that can affect the way they work and the perception of gamification. Therefore, it is important to examine how the gamification system is implemented and perceived by ride-hailing drivers in Medan and its implications for their working conditions.

Gamification

Gamification, which originally came from the world of games, has been applied in non-game environments, including the workplace since the early 20th century. This approach replaces traditional coercive methods with more fun and interactive methods. In their book, Gabe Zicherman and Christopher

Cunningham (2011) say gamification as "The use of game thinking and game mechanics to engage users and solve problems". Gamification here refers to the use of game thinking and game mechanics to strengthen relationships with users and solve problems. Purcell and Brook (2020) see gamification as a management technique that aims to direct worker focus and ensure drivers work according to targets through game elements. So, gamification can be defined as a strategy carried out by companies to motivate users by utilizing game elements in non-game contexts. The elements used by the platform are missions, points, ratings, performance, levels, challenges, and prizes.

Working Conditions

Lee & Park (2021)defines working conditions as the physical and psychological environment in the workplace and the interaction between employees and the organizational culture. The International Labor Organization (ILO, 2019) also defines working conditions as aspects of work that affect the quality of work and worker well-being. This means that working conditions will affect the quality of work of workers, so that the work produced will also be affected.

Working conditions, according toHeeks (2019), which refers to the ILO's decent work standards, is influenced by four factors, namely: adequate income, productive work, decent working hours, and a safe working environment.

THEORY

Since Braverman published his book Labor and Monopoly Capital in 1974, the discussion of the labor process has continued to develop until today. In Labor Process Theory (LPT), one of the main priorities of management in a capitalist economy is labor (Prabowo & Isbah, 2022). One of the important contributions in the development of LPT came from Michael Burawoy through his work Manufacturing Consent (1979), which introduced the concept of hegemonic control or consensual control. Burawoy explained that in the context of advanced capitalism, control over workers is not always coercive or direct, but rather is carried out through mechanisms that encourage workers to "agree" to the exploitation process through active participation in the work system. In practice, this is done through the creation of "games" in the workplace, such as incentive systems, competition between workers, and performance metrics that make workers unconsciously reproduce the logic of capital accumulation. This concept is very relevant in the gig economy, because platforms apply gamification systems into structured games that seem fun but function as tools of control.

RESEARCH METHODS

The methodology underlying this study is qualitative based on in-depth interviews. The research approach uses interpretivist phenomenology. This approach was chosen because it allows researchers to understand and explore meaning from the perspective of individuals, especially ride-hailing drivers. In interpretivism, knowledge construction is based on cumulative analysis and cross-references of individual interpretations of meaning. Thus, researchers can

dig deeper into how the Gojek and Grab platforms implement gamification of work systems as interpreted by ride-hailing drivers.

The determination of the subjects of this study used convenience sampling, with the number of participants recruited until reaching the theoretical saturation point. The theoretical saturation point is reached when data collection no longer produces new or additional insights. The subjects of this study were Gojek and Grab drivers operating in the Medan area. The interviews were conducted for approximately 60 minutes and were recorded and transcribed. Furthermore, the results of the interview transcripts will be analyzed using Nvivo12 software with open coding, query, and matrix features. Therefore, the resulting data will reveal the gamification aspects of the Gojek and Grab platforms affecting the working conditions of ride-hailing drivers in general and thus can justify several generalizations.

RESULT

The results of the matrix coding query show the relationship between gamification elements, namely challenges, ratings, points, performance, missions, levels, and rewards with working conditions consisting of: decent working hours, adequate income, productive work, and a safe working environment.



Source: processed by Nvivo12 (2025)

From the results of the query coding analysis, the mission and account level elements occupy the most dominant positions in relation to various aspects of working conditions based on decent work standards according to (Heeks, 2019). In the mission element, it was found that drivers tend to work for long periods to meet daily or weekly mission targets, thus having a direct impact on the dimensions of working time and income. However, not all drivers have the same access to available missions, depending on location, previous performance, and account status. This creates inequality and uncertainty in earning income.

The level element also reflects its own hierarchy within the platform. The higher the account level, the greater the driver's chances of receiving missions, incentives, and access to missions. Conversely, drivers with low levels tend to have difficulty getting orders even though their work duration is the same. This inequality is one of the driving factors for high work pressure, especially for drivers who depend on this job for their main income.

In ratings, points, and performance also contribute to work pressure and perceptions of insecurity. Customer-based evaluation systems such as ratings and performance encourage drivers to maintain high service standards without any guarantee of protection or room for clarification when errors occur that are not caused by the driver. In this case, a safe and productive work environment becomes vulnerable to being neglected.

Meanwhile, the reward element, although seen as a form of incentive from the platform, still contains hidden pressure. Drivers are encouraged to pursue bonuses by working longer or completing more missions, which can actually have implications for fatigue and occupational safety risks. Overall, the results of this matrix show that the gamification system implemented by the Gojek and Grab platforms contributes to the formation of stressful working conditions, with high target burdens, inequality in income access, and performance pressure. This is contrary to the principle of working conditions based on decent work standards from Heeks (2019).

Implementation of Gamification

Ride-hailing platforms Gojek and Grab use gamification elements, namely missions, as the main driver of driver work activities. This mission is implemented in the form of orders that must be completed by the driver within a certain period of time. The missions received by ride-hailing drivers come from various types of services offered by each platform.

The Gojek platform provides several services, namely, GoRide (passenger delivery), GoFood (food delivery), GoSend (goods delivery), GoMart (daily shopping), GoShop (shopping at physical stores), and GoSend Multi Delivery (delivery to several points at once). While the Grab platform also provides similar services, such as GrabBike (passenger delivery), GrabBike Hemat (passenger delivery at a cheaper cost), GrabFood (food delivery), GrabExpress (goods delivery), and GrabMart (daily shopping). The diversity of services available, the missions received by drivers become very dynamic and flexible, depending on the type of service, delivery location, operating hours, and the number of requests from customers who are actively using the application at that time.

The platform provides a choice of manual and autobid order acceptance systems. Drivers have the option to accept or reject orders, but this applies when the driver chooses to activate the manual order acceptance system. When the driver is given an order, there will be a choice to accept or reject, the driver will be given 10 seconds to choose.

Although they are allowed to reject orders, drivers are not allowed to reject them continuously. When drivers reject or cancel orders, their performance in terms of bid acceptance will decrease. If the acceptance performance drops below 93%, drivers will receive orders less often because the system considers them not active enough or less reliable. This was stated by Informant 2 from Gojek in an interview quote:

"So even though I'm not the one who canceled, the performance still went down. If the performance is less than 93%, it's hard to get orders,

because the machine sees the driver is lazy to work and often cancels orders."

Mission completion contributes directly to points earned on Gojek, the number of orders specifically on Grab. The number of points awarded also varies depending on the type of service run around 150-250 points, while the number of orders is as many as the number of missions completed.

Customers are empowered to rate drivers who have completed their missions. The rating is in the form of a one to five star rating. This rating also contributes to determining the number of missions given by the platform. Because when a driver gets a low rating, the platform algorithm will judge the driver to have served customers poorly, so the platform punishes the driver by reducing the number of missions that will be given to the driver. Informant 10 explained:

"Low stars have an effect on the number of orders received. That includes our poor service, so orders are decreasing. It also affects bid acceptance and order completion, because bid acceptance is an offer given by us, so it decreases because the previous assessment was bad. So the completion also decreases, meaning there is no acceptance, what is there to complete if nothing is accepted?"

Both Gojek and Grab provide targets to achieve account levels. In Gojek, account levels have five levels, namely basic, silver, gold, and platinum. The requirements to level up are by collecting points, accepting bids, and completing bids according to the target level, the higher the level, the higher the target given. In Grab, the levels also have five levels, namely members, fighters, knights, and champions. The requirements to reach a level are more than Gojek. Drivers must achieve targets from the number of orders, completion rate, online days, online hours and driver ratings. The following are details of the target levels on both platforms:

Table 1: Targets and Levels on Gojek and Grab Platforms

	Level	***Basic***	***Silver***	***Gold***	***Platinum***
Gojek	Points	0	50500	65500	84500
	Bid acceptance	0	93%	95%	97%
	Order completion	0	93%	95%	97%
Grab	Level	Member	Warrior	Knight	Champion
	Number of orders	0	350 orders	450 orders	500 orders
	Completion rate (%)	0	80%	90%	95%
	Online day	0	16 days	22 days	24 days
	Online hours	0	225 hours	250 hours	300 hours
	Driver Rating	0	4.88	4.89	4.9

Source: primary, processed by researchers (2025)

When the driver reaches the target, the platform will provide a reward.Each level offers something different, including one-way order quotas, GoPay cashback vouchers, and special customer service for higher levels. A similar system is implemented by Grab with various levels such as Member,

Warrior, Knight, and Champion. Drivers must meet criteria such as number of days online, online hours, order completion rate, and rating to get additional benefits such as discounts on Pertamina oil purchases, cashback on admin fees, and priority services.

The higher the level achieved, the driver will get faster access to orders, shorter waiting times, and the opportunity to earn a more stable income. The level system on the Gojek and Grab platforms does not stand alone on one element, but is directly connected to other elements. Although the systems are different, both Gojek and Grab use levels as a form of appreciation as well as a work control tool.

This incentive system seems to be a form of appreciation for the hard work and loyalty of drivers. However, when viewed from the perspective of employment relations in the gig economy, this incentive system also functions as a control tool that shapes driver behavior. The higher the level and rewards offered, the greater the pressure on drivers to maintain high performance and working hours so as not to lose access to these facilities. Thus, the reward system not only acts as a motivational trigger, but also as a disciplinary mechanism that keeps drivers tied to the competitive and hierarchical work of the platform.

In addition to level-based rewards, the platform also implements other gamification elements that help strengthen the work control mechanism, one of which is the challenge system. In Gojek, this challenge is known as Slot, for example in the GoRide Slot challenge, drivers are targeted to complete 6 orders between 06.00 and 08.00 in the morning, in certain areas, with a minimum completion rate of 96% and order acceptance of 85%. If the driver succeeds, the driver is entitled to receive an additional incentive of IDR 35,000. On the Grab platform, the challenge is packaged in the form of collecting diamonds that are only intended for the GrabFood service. For example, drivers are given the challenge "Collect 1 Diamond, Get IDR 100" by completing all missions from the GrabExpress service at certain times such as peak hours (17.00-23.59) or throughout the day.

There is also a higher incentive version, namely "Collect 80 Diamonds, Get IDR 15,000" by completing missions from GrabFood. It is voluntary in nature, but the platform offers incentives as rewards that make drivers interested and eventually follow with the motivation to take part in the challenge so they can get incentives, even though the rewards given are not large.

This game-like work system is a series of gamification used by a company, to make workers more active and work hard, but in the smoothest way possible (wicaksono). Gamification blurs the lines between work and play, because the work system is created to resemble playing a game and the lure of bonuses that can be obtained at the end of the game.

Driver Working Conditions

The narrative of flexibility inherent in gig work often masks fundamental issues in the working conditions of ride-hailing drivers. Although gig work on ride-hailing platforms is often promoted as flexible work, the reality on the ground shows that there are various challenges faced by drivers in carrying out

their profession. To see these conditions, a relevant approach is to use decent work standards as formulated by Heeks (2019) which adapts guidelines from the International Labour Organization (ILO). The decent work standards emphasize the importance of four main aspects in viewing working conditions, namely, adequate income, productive work, decent working hours, and a safe working environment. These four aspects are used as an assessment in evaluating the extent to which the Gojek and Grab platforms create working conditions based on minimum employment standards.

Table 2: "Decent Digital Work" – Gig economy standards (Heeks, 2019)

Working Conditions	Digital gig economy standards
Adequate Earnings	• At least the wages received are in accordance with the district/city minimum wage (UMK)
Productive Work	• Clear information and communication about tasks • Clear information about payments including schedules and terms and non-payments • Details of general provisions regarding client identity and purpose of assignment
Decent Working Time	• Compliance with national working hours and ILO guidelines
Safe Work Environment	• Ensure that potentially unsafe tasks are supported by social protection.

Adequate Earnings

The income earned by ride-hailing drivers reflects the reality of drivers' work in the dynamics of gig economy work. The income earned is not only seen from the nominal amount, but also the driver feels that the income is sufficient to meet daily living needs. Referring to the decent work perspective in viewing working conditions from Heeks (2019), adequate income must be able to meet basic needs and provide long-term welfare guarantees.

Grab drivers have an average income of IDR 4,220,007, while Gojek drivers have an average income of IDR 2,337,391. The difference does not reflect the difference in tariff policies between the two platforms, because the basic tariff has been regulated in the Regulation of the Minister of Transportation No. 348 of 2019, ride-hailing tariffs are divided into three zones. Zone one is Sumatra, Bali, and Java other than Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi (Jabodetabek) with a lower limit tariff of IDR 1,850/km and an upper limit tariff of IDR 2,300/km with a service fee of IDR 7,000-IDR 10,000. Zone two consists of Jabodetabek with a lower limit tariff of IDR 2,250/km and an upper limit tariff of IDR 2,650/km and a service fee of IDR 9,000-IDR 10,500. Zone three, namely Kalimantan, Sulawesi, NTT, Maluku, and Papua, has a lower limit tariff of IDR 2,100/km and an upper limit tariff of IDR 2,600/km with a service fee of IDR 7,000-IDR 10,000.

The determination of the lower and upper limit rates aims to create fairness for both parties, both drivers and customers. The lower limit rate serves to protect

drivers from being disadvantaged by price competition that is too low, so that they still get a decent minimum income. Conversely, the upper limit rate is set to prevent consumers from being charged too high rates by the platform, so that there is certainty of a fair price in online transportation services. The Minister of Transportation Regulation also regulates the 80:20 profit sharing between drivers and platforms as stated in the Decree of the Minister of Transportation Number KP 1001 of 2022. However, in practice, platforms can cut more than they should, so that the driver's net income can be smaller than it should.

In addition to zoning factors and base rates, differences in income between platforms are also influenced by the driver's account level position in the gamification system implemented by each application. This account level reflects the work performance assessed by the platform, and determines the number and type of missions received by the driver. The higher the account level, the greater the driver's chances of getting missions and incentives. The gamification scheme implemented by the platform company encourages drivers to be more active, consistent, and maintain performance in order to level up and receive better compensation. Drivers who are considered to work hard, are disciplined and work well will be given a lot of work (Novianto et al., 2023).

Referring to the 2024 Medan UMK of IDR 3,710,508, only a small number of informants' income exceeds this limit, namely drivers at the high account levels of Pejuang and Jawara from the Grab platform. The difference in income between drivers at the same level also indicates that the platform's mission distribution policy plays a role in determining the driver's work. Although Grab drivers at a low level (Member) can earn higher incomes than Gojek drivers at the equivalent level (Basic), this does not necessarily reflect Grab's superiority. The difference is more indicative of the variation in the tariff structure and mission distribution of each platform which affects the driver's income pattern.

Productive Work

In giving missions to drivers, the Gojek and Grab applications display the type of service, customer name, complete destination address, distance from the driver's location to the pick-up point, and payment method. If payment is made using an e-wallet, the application only displays the driver's income, while for cash payments, the amount of the bill that the customer must pay, as well as the driver's income, will also be displayed. After arriving at the destination and completing the mission, the driver will receive a reminder to collect cash payments from the customer, while for payments via e-wallet, the fare will automatically enter the driver's e-wallet without any reminders. The information and transparency of tasks provided by Gojek and Grab through the application are in accordance with the criteria for productive work according toHeeks (2019).

The mission distribution system on the platform is not entirely transparent to drivers. Although there is a general assumption that having an e-wallet balance can increase the chances of getting a mission, even if the balance is empty. However, he also realized a certain pattern, such as when the e-wallet is minus, he more often receives missions with non-cash payments via GoPay. This reflects that the platform indirectly directs the type of mission received by drivers based

on their balance conditions. Strategies such as 'covering a hole, digging a hole' are a form of driver adaptation to the balance system with the type and frequency of missions, which ultimately shows the dynamics of the platform's control over the way drivers work and earn money. drivers develop adaptive strategies such as maintaining a nominal balance, moving locations, or working during peak hours, these strategies are speculative and do not guarantee success because the final decision remains with the platform system which cannot be fully controlled. This places drivers in uncertain working conditions, productivity is highly dependent on a series of parameters set by the platform, not by the drivers themselves. As a result, productivity in platform work is not only about the number of missions completed, but also about how drivers are able to continue to navigate, read the patterns of the platform system, and respond to system demands in ways developed by the drivers themselves.

Decent Working Time

Based on the International Labor Organization (ILO) standard, the maximum recommended working hours are 48 hours per week. In Indonesia, the Manpower Law Number 13 of 2003 stipulates a maximum working hours of 40 hours per week, which is eight hours per day for five working days, or seven hours per day for six working days. This provision is also reaffirmed in the Job Creation Law Number 11 of 2020, although it revises several aspects of employment, but maintains the general provisions regarding working hours.
Grab drivers tend to work longer hours than Gojek drivers. The average daily working hours of Grab drivers reach 14.3 hours. If assumed to work six days a week, then drivers work around 85.8 hours per week, almost double the maximum limit. Gojek drivers have an average working hours of 12.9 hours/day. If assumed to work six days a week, then Gojek drivers work 77.4 hours per week. This clearly exceeds the standard time for decent working hours according to the ILO and the Job Creation Law.

The higher average working hours of Grab drivers compared to Gojek drivers can be attributed to the stricter assessment system and leveling requirements at Grab. Gojek drivers with Basic level still have lower working hours with an average working hours of 11.8 hours per day. On the Gojek platform, there is no online hour requirement for leveling up like in Grab, so drivers do not have a target for online hours each month, although the platform still records the number of online hours from drivers which are displayed in green, orange, and red. Even though they do not have a target for online hours from the platform, Gojek drivers still work more than 8 hours per day to collect points targeted by the platform for their drivers.

The Champion level has very long working hours, which is 16 hours per day. While drivers with the Fighter level work for 14 hours per day and the Member level works for 13.4 hours per day. This shows that the higher the driver's account level, the driver will work longer hours than drivers with lower levels.

The longer a driver has been with the platform, the higher their average daily working hours tend to be. Drivers who started working since 2017 have an

average daily working hours of 13.9 hours. Meanwhile, drivers who started working in 2018 have a slightly higher average daily working hours of 14 hours. Even drivers who started in 2019 (1 informant) have the highest average working hours, which is 15 hours per day.

Drivers who joined later showed different work patterns. Drivers who started working in 2023 had an average working hours of 13 hours per day, while drivers who joined in 2024 showed a significant decrease with an average working hours of only 8.2 hours per day. This data indicates that drivers with longer working periods tend to make this job their main livelihood, so their working hours are longer and more intense. This shows that the working hours of ride-hailing drivers in Medan exceed the limits set in decent work standards, and clearly contradict the principle of decent work which guarantees humane working hours in order to maintain a balance between work life and worker welfare.

The working conditions experienced by the drivers are in accordance with the concept of manufacturing consent put forward by Burawoy (1979), namely the form of supervision and control over workers is no longer coercive or direct, but is carried out through mechanisms that encourage workers to voluntarily comply with the existing work system. Workers are also encouraged to work longer and more productively because the work system is designed to resemble a game.

Safe Work Environment

The work environment must be free from the risk of accidents, violence, harassment, and excessive pressure. This is stated in the ILO Convention No. 155 on Occupational Safety and Health and the Working Environment which emphasizes that the state and companies must ensure preventive measures and protection for workers. However, in the gig economy, such as ride-hailing drivers in Indonesia, the fulfillment of this principle is still very limited.

One of the main problems lies in the legal status of drivers who are categorized as partners, not workers. With this status, drivers are not included in the scope of formal employment relationships as referred to in the Manpower Law, so platform companies such as Gojek and Grab do not have a legal obligation to guarantee overall work safety. This is because there is no strong regulatory basis to demand compliance with work safety standards.

Data on the trend of social security participation of ride-hailing drivers shows an increase in participation in the BPJS Ketenagakerjaan program, although not all drivers participate. On the Grab platform, more than 8,000 GrabBike drivers were registered as BPJS Ketenagakerjaan participants in 2016, increasing to 15,000 in 2018, and continuing to increase to 30,000 people in 2024. Gojek recorded the number of participants at around 7,000 drivers in 2017, increasing to 74,000 registered drivers in 2019 and jumping to 176,365 drivers in 2024. This shows an increase in awareness of the importance of social protection, although participation is optional and not covered by the company.

From 16 informants interviewed, only 10 informants participated in the BPJS Ketenagakerjaan program. Of the 8 informants from the Gojek platform, 5

of them have BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, while 3 others do not. Likewise on the Grab platform, of the 8 informants, only 5 people are registered as BPJS Ketenagakerjaan participants, while the remaining 3 do not participate in the program. This finding reflects that even though there is an opportunity to access social protection through BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, there are still many drivers who have not participated, especially on the Grab platform. This is also in line with the national trend that shows the low level of participation of gig workers from the Grab platform in the social security program.

Outside of formal social protection schemes, Grab provides accident insurance for its driver partners as an additional form of protection. When a driver has an accident while working, the driver can contact a Grab task force officer who will assist the driver's medical needs.

The risk of accidents and crime on the road is an inseparable part of the reality of ride-hailing drivers' work, especially in big cities like Medan which have high levels of congestion, damaged road conditions, and drivers who often violate traffic rules. These risks are exacerbated by long and uncertain working hours, which have an impact on decreasing concentration while driving.

Economic needs force some drivers to continue working at night despite increased security risks. Anticipatory strategies against the threat of street crime are a form of individual adaptation in dealing with work vulnerabilities.(Mustika & Savirani, 2021;(Novianto, 2024). Drivers will mark areas prone to robbery, so that unwanted things can be anticipated. Another strategy developed by drivers is to share real-time locations with fellow colleagues through community WhatsApp groups or driver alliances.

Solidarity among ride-hailing drivers in Medan is organic, formed naturally from shared work experiences, so its strength is not always stable. One of the causes is the Gojek platform policy which introduced a new type of account starting in August 2023 which drivers call Aceng (Argo Goceng). This account is only intended for food delivery services, with regional restrictions and a very low delivery fee, which is only IDR 5,000. The amount of the fee does not match the official rate set by the Ministry of Transportation. This condition triggers horizontal conflict between drivers and weakens the spirit of collectivity that was previously quite strong in the community.

Based on findings in the field, it is clear that the flexible work structure in the gig economy does not necessarily guarantee the safety and health of ride-hailing drivers. The absence of legal protection and minimal social protection means that drivers have to face work risks independently. This situation is exacerbated by the gamification-based work mechanism implemented by platform companies. Gamification applies game elements to the work system that encourage drivers to work longer, faster, and at certain hours that are considered profitable by the driver. This system indirectly encourages drivers to take greater risks in order to achieve their targets to level up. Drivers are encouraged to stay late or work until late at night because the chances of getting missions are greater compared to morning or afternoon. Although at night there is a higher level of risk because it is prone to robbery.

The occupational safety risks faced by drivers, ranging from accidents to the threat of crime at night, are a reality that is often faced without adequate protection. A work system that encourages drivers to be active at critical times actually increases their vulnerability to physical harm. In this situation, drivers are left to face risks individually, without serious intervention from the platform or the state. This shows that the aspect of occupational safety in the gig economy has not been a priority, and needs immediate attention in the protection of digital informal work.

The working conditions of ride-hailing drivers in Medan based on decent work standards according to Heeks (2019) show that out of four working conditions, three of them do not comply with decent work conditions. The income earned by drivers does not reach the Medan City Minimum Wage (UMK) in 2024, which is IDR 3,710,508 when the driver does not reach a high account level. Only drivers who are at a high level on the Grab platform, namely Kesatria and Jawara, have incomes above the UMK. Drivers' working hours are also very long with an average of 14 hours per day due to the high target set by the platform to reach a high account level. This is far from decent and violates the rules that the maximum working hours are 48 hours per week based on the International Labor Organization (ILO) standards, and the Job Creation Law Number 11 of 2020, which is eight hours per day for five working days, or seven hours per day for six working days.

A safe working environment that can be done by providing protection to drivers has also been done, but the platform is only a third party that connects drivers and BPJS Ketenagakerjaan which is optional with a contribution of IDR 16,800. This happens because the platform classifies drivers as partners and is permitted by regulations in Indonesia. Therefore, the platform is not required to provide social security to drivers, even though working as an ride-hailing driver has a high risk because they are on the road for hours, there are even drivers who work up to 16 hours per day. However, the Grab platform provides accident insurance for drivers in order to provide protection without being charged a monthly contribution fee to the driver. This is something positive that is done by the platform, although in terms of the working duration of Grab drivers is longer than Grab drivers.

The platform provides missions to drivers with fairly clear information, so that this productive work is in accordance with decent working conditions according to Heeks (2019). Although there are other problems with driver productivity because missions are given randomly and prioritize high-performance drivers referring to the driver's account level. This makes drivers not know the number of missions the platform gives to drivers per day and creates uncertainty about the income that drivers will get every day.

The working conditions of ride-hailing drivers in Medan, when compared to the four dimensions of decent work according to Heeks (2019), show that three of the four dimensions have not been met. First, in terms of income, the income received by most drivers has not reached the Medan City Minimum Wage (UMK) in 2024, which is IDR 3,710,508, especially for drivers who are not at the top account level. Only drivers at high levels such as Kesatria and Jawara (Grab) are

able to earn income above the UMK. This indicates that incentives that should encourage productivity actually create inequality and uncertainty of income among drivers.

Second, in terms of working hours, the majority of drivers work an average of 14 hours per day. This number far exceeds the provisions of decent working hours according to the International Labor Organization (ILO) which sets a maximum limit of 48 hours per week, and violates the provisions of the Job Creation Law Number 11 of 2020, which regulates working hours of eight hours per day for five working days or seven hours per day for six working days.These long working hours are carried out without receiving overtime pay which is paid in the formal sector to workers with employee classifications.(Novianto et al., 2023)Thus, the work system implemented by the platform directly encourages drivers to work beyond the legally recognized working hours, without any compensation or additional protection. This reflects the weak state supervision of violations of labor regulations in the digital work sector.

Third, regarding occupational safety and health protection, the platform basically does not provide comprehensive guarantees. The BPJS Employment offered is optional and all contribution costs are borne by the driver himself at Rp16,800 permonths. The platform only acts as a liaison, without any legal obligation to guarantee social protection due to the partnership status that is strategically used to avoid responsibility as an employer. In fact, this work is very risky because it is done on the streets for long hours, even up to 16 hours a day. Although Grab provides accident insurance without contribution fees, this effort has not touched the root of the systemic problems that cause this vulnerability.

Fourth, the aspect of work productivity seems to be the only dimension that is relatively in line with decent work indicators. The platform provides missions with fairly clear information, allowing drivers to complete their tasks efficiently. However, the mission distribution system is selective and performance-based, with priority given to drivers with high account levels. As a result, drivers are uncertain about the number of daily missions they will receive. This situation creates uncertainty in daily income, while increasing work pressure because drivers feel they have to maintain high performance in order to consistently receive missions.

The working conditions experienced by drivers are in accordance with the concept of manufacturing consent put forward by Burawoy (1979), namely that the form of supervision and control over workers is no longer coercive or direct, but rather carried out through mechanisms that encourage workers to voluntarily comply with the existing work system. Workers are also encouraged to work longer and more productively because the work system is designed to resemble a game. Burawoy explains that in modern capitalist production, the form of control is not always carried out through direct coercion, but rather by creating a gamified work structure, which seems to provide freedom and incentives, while in fact substantially maintaining exploitative work relations. As emphasized by Burawoy, "The labor process is organized in such a way that workers come to corporate in their own exploitation." Thus, the gamification system in platform work is not only a motivational tool, but also a control

mechanism that makes drivers actively involved in work patterns that indirectly exploit themselves.

Gamification applied in the Gojek and Grab platforms cannot be separated from the real impacts experienced by drivers. The mission, point, rating, level, performance, challenge and incentive systems that initially seemed like motivational strategies, actually create high work pressure. Drivers push themselves to continue working in order to earn income, even if they have to sacrifice time, energy, and even health. Drivers' income becomes uncertain because it depends on the platform's system which can change according to platform policy. On the other hand, drivers have no control over the number or type of missions received, so their dependence on the platform is very high. The promised flexibility is ultimately just an illusion, because drivers are still controlled by the platform's system. In situations like this, hidden exploitation occurs, drivers are encouraged to exploit themselves in order to survive in the platform ecosystem.

CONCLUSION

The Gojek and Grab platforms implement various gamification elements of missions, points, levels, ratings, performance, challenges, and rewards to regulate and direct the work behavior of drivers. These elements do not stand alone, but are integrated into an algorithmic system that subtly but effectively creates a work control mechanism. This system forms a work structure that resembles a game, drivers are encouraged to continue pursuing targets in order to obtain rewards or avoid penalties. Drivers work harder and for longer durations to collect points, maintain ratings and performance, and reach certain levels in order to obtain additional incentives. However, the incentives given are getting smaller and not commensurate with the workload borne, making this system tend to exploit drivers in a hidden way. Gamification not only motivates, but also wraps work control and expectations in a fun and seemingly participatory form, when in fact it is oppressive and demanding.

The working conditions of drivers on the Gojek and Grab platforms are still far from decent work standards according to Heeks (2019). Drivers' working hours are very long, even reaching 14 hours per day, without the certainty of adequate income. Although the platform provides information through the application, the work done is still overshadowed by uncertainty because work performance is automatically assessed by the platform and can change at any time. The assessment is carried out in a non-transparent manner, and contributes to high work pressure. The income received by drivers is also unstable, because it depends on changing incentive schemes and external factors such as market demand or weather conditions. The working environment is also far from safe, drivers in Medan face the risk of crime on the road, namely muggings which further worsen working conditions. In terms of social protection, although the platform connects drivers with BPJS Ketenagakerjaan, all contributions are still borne by the driver himself because of the driver's status as a partner.

SUGGESTION

The gamification system designed unilaterally by the platform without involving drivers actually strengthens unequal power relations and increases work pressure. Therefore, Gojek and Grab need to encourage participatory gamification, by involving drivers in the design, evaluation, and incentive processes. This involvement can be facilitated through strengthening driver organizations and participatory regulatory advocacy, in order to create collective control over the work system and reduce the hidden exploitation generated by gamification.

The working conditions of ride-hailing drivers that do not meet decent work standards require a collective response, not just individual resistance. However, in Medan, the weakness of the driver organization due to internal conflict is an obstacle. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the independent and democratic driver community or union, with a mediation space and digital legal assistance. A solid organization is important so that the driver's voice is organized, able to negotiate, and face unfair regulations.

Ride-hailing drivers face high work pressure, uncertain income, and dependence on the platform system, without adequate legal protection. Current regulations are still limited to the transportation aspect by the Ministry of Transportation, while the Ministry of Manpower has not recognized the de facto employment relationship between drivers and platforms due to their "partner" status. Cross-ministerial regulations (Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Manpower, Ministry of Communication and Information) are needed that stipulate the rights and obligations of both parties, guarantee social protection, and provide a fair and transparent dispute resolution mechanism. Without a clear legal umbrella, drivers remain vulnerable.

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