Effect of Audit Delay, Audit Fee, Audit Tenure, and Going Concern Opinion for Voluntary Auditor Switching
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the effect of audit delay, fees, tenure, and opinion going concern on voluntary auditor switching in financial sector companies listed on the IDX from 2017 to 2022. This research uses a quantitative approach with secondary data and a purposive sample of 222 companies. using logistic regression analysis with SPSS version 26. The results revealed that audit delay has a significant positive effect, while audit tenure has a significant negative effect on voluntary auditor switching. However, audit fees and going-concern opinions have no significant effect on voluntary auditor switching.

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INTRODUCTION

Financial statements are a very important tool that shows the company's performance in a certain period (Zubir, 2020). According to IAI, financial reports have the goal of presenting statistics regarding the economic role, economic overall performance, and cash flows of an entity that is useful for most document customers in making selections. Therefore, good financial reports must meet the qualitative characteristics of financial reports, namely understandable, relevant, reliable, and comparable following the Basic Framework for Preparing the Presentation of Financial Statements in PSAK.

An independent auditor is needed to guarantee the reliability of a company's financial statements from various conflicts of interest. Auditor independence can be disrupted by a long tenure relationship between the auditor and the client because the length of the relationship can reduce the capacity of the auditor's critical and objective assessment of the company he is auditing (Salleh & Jasmani, 2014). To be able to maintain the independence of the auditor, it is necessary to have auditor switching. Auditor switching is the replacement of KAPs and auditors by companies which in general can occur either mandatory or voluntarily. Voluntary auditor switching is usually carried out at the initiative of the client or because of the auditor, while mandatory switching is regulated in laws and regulations (Rahma, 2021).

Compulsory replacement of auditors in RI Government Regulation No. 20 of 2015 article 11 paragraph (1) that the provision of audit services on historical financial information by a public accountant for a company is limited to a maximum of 5 times in a row. financial year by the same public accountant and is required to cool off for 2 consecutive years or stop auditing the company for 2 years to avoid the emergence of a special relationship between the auditor and the company due to the long tenure. This regulation was similarly tightened with the aid of POJK quantity thirteen of 2017 concerning using Public Accountants and KAP offerings in economic provider sports. The regulation stipulates that economic provider institutions have to limit the use of audit offerings from public accountants for most three consecutive economic years. in the meantime, restrictions on the use of KAP offerings rely upon the assessment consequences of the Audit Committee. similarly, economic provider establishments need to use public accountants and KAPs registered with the OJK.

Auditor changes can occur not only from government regulations but some factors are indicated to increase or decrease the possibility of auditor changes. (Cokorda & Saputra, 2019). Voluntary auditor switching is different from mandatory which can be caused by various factors, including caused by the client or the auditor himself. If the client does a switching auditors but there are no rules requiring a change of auditor, there will be two possibilities that may occur, namely the auditor being dismissed by the client or the auditor resigning (Arisudhana, 2017).

The most recent case that occurred in Indonesia at this time was the case of PT. Adisarana Wanaarthra Life Insurance (WanaArtha Life). financial reports engineered by WanaArtha Life so that the information in the financial reports submitted to the OJK and published to the public is not correct by the actual
conditions of PT. Adisarana Wanaartha Life Insurance. As a result, professional support institutions that audit companies' financial statements also receive strict sanctions from the OJK. This case shows that a relationship between the KAP or the auditor and the company that lasts a long time can cause an auditor to decrease or decrease (Octaviano, 2023). Facts regarding the reason for the change of auditors were never disclosed in the financial statements (Faradila & Yahya, 2016). It is not uncommon for auditors to experience substantial problems because they try to adhere to their professional principles, but at the same time, auditors are also required to follow the wishes of management (Dewi & Triyanto, 2020).

Auditor switching voluntarily can come from the client or the auditor. Factors regarding the reasons for voluntary auditor changes need to be reviewed, while the causal factors from the company such as company size, management changes, and financial distress, while the causal factors from the auditor include audit delay, audit fees, audit tenure, and going concern opinion (Dewi & Triyanto, 2020). This study examines voluntary auditor switching caused by auditors.

The researcher conducted a new study on the influence of audit delay, audit fees, audit tenure, and going concern opinions on voluntary auditor switching. This decision was motivated by the inconsistencies found in previous studies on voluntary auditor switching and the phenomenon described, which further strengthened the researcher's desire to investigate the impact of these variables on voluntary auditor switching. The research focused on financial sector companies as the objects of the study.

This choice was based on the fact that the financial sector is subject to special supervision by the OJK (Financial Services Authority), as indicated by the POJK (Financial Services Authority Regulation) Number 13 of 2017 regarding the use of public accountants and accounting firms in financial activities. Additionally, several cases, such as financial statement manipulation, have highlighted the compromised independence of auditors. Despite the tightened regulations imposed by the OJK on the financial sector, the occurrence of such cases suggests that violations of these regulations by financial sector companies are still possible. Therefore, the researcher was interested in conducting the study specifically on financial sector companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange (BEI).

LITERATURE REVIEW
Agency Theory
The agency theory put forward by Jensen & Meckling (1976) explains that the agency relationship is a contractual relationship in which the shareholder (principal) asks the management (agent) to perform tasks on behalf of the principal which involves delegating tasks or authority and making business decisions made by management. In agency relationships, problems arise, namely information asymmetry, information imbalance occurs because the agent as the manager of the company has more complete information than the principal.

There are different interests between agents and principals so conflicts of interest often occur. Because of this, a third party is needed that can bridge the
interests of both parties, namely by presenting an independent auditor. Investors as external parties see accounting information produced by company management tend to trust more that produced by independent auditors. To create financial reports that are reliable and away from the influence of agents. So the connection between the auditor and the organization should be restrained to auditor switching (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

**Auditor Switching**

The change of auditors and/or public accounting firms (KAP) carried out by companies is called auditor switching. Auditor switching (auditor switching) is very crucial for organizations because it can triumph over the emergence of issues by lowering audit great as a result of the lengthy relationship between the auditor and the customer organization (Rahmadina et al., 2021).

This auditor or KAP replacement can be divided into mandatory auditor replacement (compulsory) and voluntary auditor replacement (voluntary). This regulation, stated in the Government Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 20 of 2015 article 11 paragraph (1), pertains to the replacement of auditors and aims to prevent a prolonged relationship between the auditor and the company. According to this regulation, a public accountant can provide audit services for a company's historical financial information for a maximum of five consecutive financial years. Afterward, the public accountant must take a two-year break or cease auditing the company altogether to avoid the development of a special relationship between the auditor and the company. This provision is in place to ensure auditor independence (Stevani & Siagian, 2020). To measure this aspect, a dummy variable is used. If a company voluntarily switches auditors, the variable is coded as 1. Conversely, if the company does not engage in voluntary auditor switching, the variable is coded as 0.

**Audit Delay**

Audit delays refer to the duration between the closing date of a company's books, typically December 31, and the date when the audited annual financial statements are made available to the general public or submitted to the Economic Offering Authority (OJK). Timeliness plays a crucial role in financial statement reporting, as it is a prerequisite for achieving relevance. Without timeliness, the information presented in the financial statements may lose its significance. Consequently, timeliness represents a significant challenge in the timely publication of financial statements. To measure this variable, the number of days is calculated by counting the duration between the company's book closing date and the date stated in the independent auditor's report (Tifanny et al., 2020).

Research conducted by Dwiphayana & Dharma Suputra (2019) and Stevani & Siagian (2020) found that audit delay affects voluntary auditor turnover. The longer the auditor carries out their audit duties, the higher the chance for the company to perform voluntary auditor switching. In contrast, research conducted by Luthfi & Sari (2019) states that audit delay does not affect voluntary auditor switching.
Audit Fee

An audit fee is a reward in the form of a certain amount of money given to the auditor or KAP from their client for the audit services provided. The quantity of member charges may also range depending on the threat of the mission, the complexity of the services supplied, the level of knowledge required to perform the services, the value structure of the KAP involved, and different expert issues (Humairo & Rahayu, 2019). More experienced auditors will charge a higher audit fee because experienced auditors will reflect the quality of the audit services provided (Dewi & Triyanto, 2020). This variable is calculated using the ln(professional honorarium) formula.

Research conducted by Najwa & Syofyan (2020) and Adli & Suryani (2019) states that audit fees affect voluntary auditor switching. High fee requests by auditors will encourage companies to make voluntary auditor changes. In contrast, research conducted by Dewi & Triyanto (2020) states that audit fees do not affect voluntary auditor switching.

Audit Tenure

The period of the audit engagement relationship between the Public Accounting Firm (KAP) and the entity related to the provision of agreed audit services is called the audit tenure. Issues regarding audit tenure are usually associated with its effect on auditor independence (Kirana & Indriansyah, 2022). It is feared that audit tenure over a long period can lead to a loss of independence from an auditor (Maemunah & Nofryanti, 2019). Audit tenure in this study is measured by adding up the total length of the audit engagement before the auditor changes.

Research conducted by Maemunah & Nofryanti (2019) and Rizky et al. (2022) states that audit tenure affects voluntary auditor switching. The longer the auditor's engagement with the company, the more special relationships will arise which can make the level of independence of an auditor decrease which triggers the company to make voluntary auditor changes. In contrast, research conducted by (Gultom, 2019) states that audit tenure does not affect voluntary auditor switching.

Opini Going Concern

To ensure the survival of the company can be maintained or not the auditor gives an opinion called Opinion to maintain the business. If there is evidence after the test results that cause an auditor to doubt the defense of a company, an auditor will consider issuing a going concern audit opinion (Dewi & Triyanto, 2020). This study was measured using a dummy variable for. This means that the company will be given a score of 0 if it does not receive a going concern opinion and number 1 if the company receives a going concern opinion.

Research conducted by Dewi & Triyanto (2020) and Muntuan & Hutapea (2022) states that going concern opinion affects voluntary auditor switching. If the company receives a going concern opinion, then the company is likely to do voluntary auditor switching because the company does not want to be harmed by a going concern audit opinion. In contrast, research conducted by Zubir (2020) states that going concern opinion does not affect voluntary auditor switching.

From the explanation that has been described, the description of the relationship between variables through the following framework:
HIPOTESIS
H1: Audit delay, audit fee, audit tenure, and going concern opinion affect voluntary auditor switching
H2: Audit delay affects voluntary auditor switching
H3: Audit fee affects voluntary auditor switching
H4: Audit tenure affects voluntary auditor switching
H5: Going concern opinion affects voluntary auditor switching

METHODOLOGY
This study employs a quantitative research approach known as causal-comparative research. Causal-comparative research aims to examine the causal relationships and effects that occur among multiple variables, where the researcher manipulates certain variables for special treatment (Najwa & Syofyan, 2020). In this study, the dependent variable is voluntary auditor switching, while the independent variables include audit delay, audit fees, audit tenure, and going concern opinions.

The data for this research is obtained from secondary sources through the website www.idx.co.id. The data consists of a sample size of 222 observations, selected from a population of 564 financial sector companies listed on the IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange) from 2017 to 2022. The data analysis method employed in this study is logistic regression analysis, performed using the SPSS Version 26 software.
RESEARCH RESULT

Descriptive statistics

Table 1. Results of Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audit Delay</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>78,40</td>
<td>31,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Fee</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>18,39</td>
<td>25,22</td>
<td>21,390</td>
<td>1,36081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Tenure</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,57</td>
<td>.707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N (listwise)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above explains the results of the descriptive statistics of each variable as follows:

1. In this study, there are a total of 222 observations (N).
2. Audit Delay (X1) has a minimum value of 15, while the maximum value is 166. The standard deviation is 31.89 and the mean (average) value is 78.40 which indicates that the average value of financial sector companies experiences audit delay of about 78 days.
3. The audit Fee (X2) has a minimum value of 18.39 and a maximum audit fee value of 25.22. The standard deviation is 1.36 and the mean (average) value is 21.39 which indicates that the average value of audit fees for financial sector companies is 21.39.
4. Audit Tenure (X3) has a minimum value of 1 and a maximum value of 3. The standard deviation value is 0.70 and the mean (average) value is 1.57 which indicates that the average tenure audit of financial sector companies is for more than 1 year.

All variables in the form of nominal data (dummy), namely going concern opinion and voluntary auditor switching were analyzed using a frequency distribution to determine the sample distribution. The results of the frequency distribution analysis are presented in the following table.

Table 2. Frequency Distribution Results of Going Concern Opinions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opini Going Concern</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Getting Going Concern Opinion</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>87,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Get Opinion Going Concerned</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows that the results of the analysis of the frequency distribution were 12.2% or 27 companies received a going concern opinion from the auditor, while the other 87.8%, or 195 sample companies did not receive a going concern opinion. This shows that the percentage of the sample that gets a going concern opinion is less than the companies that do not get a going concern opinion.
Table 3. Frequency Distribution Results of Voluntary Auditor Switching

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voluntary Auditor Switching</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Performing Voluntary Auditor Switching</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perform Voluntary Auditor Switching</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of the analysis of the frequency distribution of the sample that did voluntary auditor switching were as much as 31.5% or as many as 70 sample companies, while the sample that did not do voluntary auditor switching was also as much as 68.5% or as many as 152 samples. Based on the results of the frequency distribution, it can be concluded that fewer companies do voluntary auditor switching than companies that do not do voluntary auditor switching.

Logistic Regression Analysis Regression Model Feasibility Test

Table 4. Hosmer and Lemeshow Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hosmer and Lemeshow Test</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the table above, the Chi-Square value is 3.893 with a significance value of 0.867, indicating that the significance value is greater than 0.05. Since the significance value is above 0.05, the regression model in this study is considered feasible (fit) or H0 can be accepted as it aligns with the observed data.

Overall Model Fit

Table 5. Overall Model Fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-2LL (Block Number = 0)</th>
<th>276,740</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-2LL (Block Number = 1)</td>
<td>186,559</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table provided illustrates the comparison between the initial -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) values and the final -2LL values. Initially, at Block Number 0, the -2LL value was recorded as 276,740. However, at Block Number 1, the -2LL value decreased significantly to 186,559. This reduction of 90.181 in the likelihood suggests that the regression model demonstrates better fit with the data, indicating that the hypothesized model is suitable for the dataset.
Hypothesis Determination Coefficient

Table 6. Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The provided table illustrates that Nagelkerke's R-squared value is 0.469. This indicates that approximately 46.9% of the variability in the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variables, namely audit delay, audit fee, audit tenure, and going concern opinion. The remaining 54.1% is attributed to other variables that fall outside the scope of the research model.

Omnibus Test

Table 7. Omnibus Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the table, the difference between the -2 Log Likelihood value before introducing the dependent variable to the model and the -2 Log Likelihood value after introducing the independent variable to the model is 90.181 (276.740 - 186.559). The Chi-Square value is 90.470 > Chi-Square table at df 4 (the number of independent variables is 4) which is 9.49 or with a significance of 0.000 <0.05. This indicates that the inclusion of independent variables can have a significant impact on the model, indicating that the model is considered to be well-fitted. Thus, the variable audit delay (X1), audit fee (X2), audit tenure (X3), and going concern opinion (X4) affect voluntary auditor switching (Y).

T-test

Table 8. T-test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Delay</td>
<td>016</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>6,813</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>1,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Fee</td>
<td>-.108</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.645</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>.898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Tenure</td>
<td>-3,530</td>
<td>.626</td>
<td>31,801</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opini Going Concern</td>
<td>-.906</td>
<td>.575</td>
<td>2,488</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4,922</td>
<td>2,993</td>
<td>2,704</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>137,293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From testing the regression equation, the regression model is obtained as follows:

$$Y = 4.922 + 0.016AD - 0.108AF - 3.530AT - 0.906OGC + e \quad \text{................. (1)}$$

The regression equation above can be interpreted that:

1. A constant of 4.922 states that without the influence of the four independent variables, financial sector companies listed on the IDX in 2017-2022 will still carry out voluntary auditor switching of 4.922.
2. The regression coefficient of audit delay (X1) is 0.016 (positive). The positive parameter states that changes in voluntary auditor switching will be in the same direction as changes in audit delay (X1).
3. The regression coefficient of the audit fee variable (X2) is -0.108 (negative). The negative parameter states that changes in voluntary auditor switching will have a different direction from the direction of changes in audit fees (X2).
4. The regression coefficient of the tenure audit variable (X3) is -3.530 (negative). The negative parameter states that changes in voluntary auditor switching will be different from the direction of changes in audit tenure (X3).
5. The regression coefficient of the going concern opinion variable (X4) is -0.916 (negative). The negative parameter states that changes in voluntary auditor switching will be different from the direction of changes in going concern opinion (X4).

**DISCUSSION**

**Effect of Audit Delay Audit Fee, Audit Tenure, and Going Concern Opinion on Voluntary Auditor Switching**

The Omnibus Test results indicate a Chi-Square value of 90.181 (276.740 - 186.559). This Chi-Square value exceeds the critical Chi-Square value in the table for 4 degrees of freedom (df) at 9.49, with a significance level of 0.000, indicating a significance below 0.05. Therefore, the inclusion of independent variables has a significant impact on the model. Consequently, the variables audit delay (X1), audit fee (X2), audit tenure (X3), and going concern opinion (X4) have a significant influence on voluntary auditor switching (Y) in financial sector companies listed on the IDX from 2017 to 2021, supporting H1. The Nagelkerke R-squared value is 0.469 or 46.9%, suggesting that 46.9% of the variability in the voluntary auditor switching variable can be explained by the audit delay, audit fee, audit tenure, and going concern opinion variables.

**Effect of Audit Delay on Voluntary Auditor Switching**

Tests show that the audit delay variable (X1) has a significant effect of 0.009, this value is lower than 0.05 with a coefficient value of 0.016. So the audit delay variable has a significant positive effect on voluntary auditor switching. So that the hypothesis can be supported or in other words, H2 is accepted.

Due to the complexity of the audit process carried out by the auditor causing audit delays. This high level of audit complexity can also result in an auditor using an audit method that requires more and more complicated companies to complete certain audits and their subsidiaries (Dwiphayana & Suputra, 2019). If the audit delay shows a significant number, this will indicate that the accounting information contained in the financial statements will be late for investors. Even
though the accounting information will be used by investors as material for consideration in investing their funds in the company concerned. This condition reasons the organization to be past due in obtaining extra budget to finance its operational sports. This is what causes the company to do voluntary auditor switching.

Previous research that supports the findings of this study concludes that audit delay has a positive and significant effect on voluntary auditor switching which was previously carried out by (Arisudhana, 2017), (Gultom, 2019), and (Stevani & Siagian, 2020). However, contrary to research conducted by (Lianto, 2017) and (Luthfi & Sari, 2019).

**Effect of Audit Fee on Voluntary Auditor Switching**

Tests show that the audit fee variable (X2) has a significance of 0.422, this value is greater than 0.05 with a coefficient value of -0.108. So the audit fee variable has no significant effect on voluntary auditor switching. So that the hypothesis cannot be supported or in other words, H3 is rejected.

This study proves that there is no effect of audit fees on voluntary auditor switching in financial sector companies because the size of the audit fee charged by the auditor to the company does not influence the company to carry out voluntary auditor switching. The change of auditors in financial sector companies is still in the same public accounting firm. This resulted in the range of audit fees at the time of auditor change not much different or only increasing and decreasing slightly from the previous year. the size of the audit fee in the audit process will still be approved by the company as long as the benefits in the form of auditor performance results are proportional to the number of costs incurred by the company.

Previous research that supports the findings of this study concludes that audit fees do not affect voluntary auditor switching which was previously carried out by (Rahmadina et al., 2021), (Pratiwi, 2019) and (Stevani & Siagian, 2020). However, contrary to research conducted by (Najwa & Syofyan, 2020) and (Dewi & Triyanto, 2020).

**Effect of Tenure Audit on Voluntary Auditor Switching**

Tests show that the tenure audit variable (X3) has a significance effect of 0.000, this value is lower than 0.05 with a coefficient value of -3.530. So the audit tenure variable has a significant negative effect on voluntary auditor switching. So that the hypothesis can be supported or in other words, H4 is accepted.

The longer the company's audit period, the more difficult it is for the company to rotate its auditors. The company does not want to change its auditor because the relationship between the company and the auditor has been established for a long time. Because the auditor obtained the audit results desired by the company. And auditors who have long provided audits of companies are more familiar with the environment of the companies they are auditing, making it easier for auditors to do their work. The emergence of a special relationship due to a long tenure can reduce the level of auditor independence, this relationship can cause the resulting audit results to be not credible or unable to assure the fairness of an entity's financial statements which then triggers the company to make a change of auditors before the limit of 3 years (Maemunah & Nofryanti, 2019).
Previous research that supports the findings of this study concludes that tenure audits harm voluntary auditor switching which was previously carried out by (Maemunah & Nofryanti, 2019) and (Rizky et al., 2022). However, contrary to research conducted by (Luthfi & Sari, 2019).

**The Effect of Going Concern Opinion on Voluntary Auditor Switching**

Tests show that the going concern opinion variable (X4) has a significance of 0.115, this value is greater than 0.05 with a coefficient value of -0.906. So the going concern opinion variable has no significant effect on voluntary auditor switching. So the hypothesis cannot be supported or in other words, H5 is rejected.

This examination proves that there's no impact of going difficulty opinion on voluntary auditor switching in economic area corporations because obtaining a going challenge opinion could make an organization able to get a negative reaction from capital market gamers at the high quality of its economic reports. Further, the agency fears that the going difficulty opinion will lessen the consideration of outside parties inside the enterprise's performance so that the corporation's control overcomes this circumstance earlier than the auditor issues an opinion. The reason for the outcomes of this observation is that companies also want to don't forget the dangers they may face if they do auditor switching. It's miles feared that the trade of a public accounting firm from a huge 4 KAP public accountant to a Non-large 4 KAP public accountant could result in a bad response from market gamers closer to the first-class of the organization's economic reviews (Antoni et al., 2018).

Previous research that supports the findings of this study concludes that going concern opinion does not affect voluntary auditor switching which was previously carried out by (Zubir, 2020) and (Pratiwi, 2019). However, contrary to research conducted by (Muntuan & Hutapea, 2022).
CONCLUSION
Based on the results of the analysis that has explained the effect of Audit Delay (X1), Audit Fee (X2), Audit Tenure (X3), and Going Concern Opinion (X4) on Voluntary Auditor Switching (Y), it can be concluded that:

1) Audit delay, audit fee, audit tenure, and going concern opinion affect voluntary auditor switching. The magnitude of influence provided by each variable on voluntary auditor switching in financial sector companies is 46.9%.

2) The Audit Delay variable has a significant positive effect on Voluntary Auditor Switching. This means that the longer the independent auditor's report is issued, the higher the tendency for financial sector companies to perform voluntary auditor switching will be.

3) The audit fee variable does not affect voluntary auditor switching. Because auditor switching in financial sector companies still occurs within the same public accounting firm, it results in the audit fee range during auditor transitions not being significantly different or only experiencing slight increases or decreases compared to the previous year.

4) The tenure audit variable has a significant negative effect on voluntary auditor switching. This means that the shorter the tenure of a company with its auditor, the higher the tendency for financial sector companies to perform voluntary auditor switching will be.

5) The going concern opinion variable does not affect voluntary auditor switching. Because financial sector companies are able to address potential issues that may arise, causing auditors to provide a going concern opinion.

ADVANCED RESEARCH
This study only examines the influence of the variable causes of voluntary auditor switching from auditors. Future research is expected to add to the factors from the company that may influence voluntary auditor switching. Further research is expected to add other sector companies listed on the IDX and increase the observation time.

REFERENCES


