



Reform of the Conflict-of-Interest Regulations for Judges in Judicial Mafia Practices to Guarantee the Independence of the Judicial Power

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the provisions on judicial conflicts of interest in Indonesian positive law and formulate a reconstruction of these provisions as an effort to strengthen the independence of the judiciary. The method used is normative juridical research with a statutory and conceptual approach, through a review of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, and the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct. The results of the study indicate that although there are provisions regarding judicial independence and the prohibition of conflicts of interest, the existing norms are still general in nature, lack clear operational definitions, and are not supported by effective disclosure and recusal mechanisms. This condition opens up space for the practice of judicial mafia, which has an impact on declining public trust in the judiciary. Therefore, a reconstruction of the provisions on judicial conflicts of interest is needed through affirmation of norms, strengthening disclosure and resignation mechanisms, and integrating a more transparent and accountable oversight system. This research is expected to provide theoretical contributions to legal development and practical contributions to the reform of the judicial system in Indonesia.

INTRODUCTION

Within the framework of a state based on the rule of law, the existence of an independent judiciary is a primary prerequisite for upholding the supremacy of law and protecting human rights. (Safa'at, 2024) The Indonesian Constitution expressly affirms this through Article 1 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which states that Indonesia is a state based on the rule of law, and Article 24 paragraph (1), which affirms that the judiciary is an independent power to administer justice to uphold law and justice. (Rachmadika, 2024) This independence is not only interpreted institutionally, but also personally by the judge in the form of impartiality and freedom from the influence of any party (independence). This principle is aligned with international standards such as the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, which emphasize the values of independence, integrity, and impartiality of judges as the main foundation of the judicial system. (Situmorang, 2024) Thus, normatively, judges are required to be free from all forms of conflict of interest so that the resulting decisions truly reflect objective justice.

However, the reality of judicial practice in Indonesia shows significant deviations from this ideal condition. The phenomenon of judicial mafia, which includes bribery, case buying and selling, and intervention in the judicial process, still frequently occurs and is in the public spotlight. (Awaludin, 2025) Several cases involving law enforcement officials, including judges, demonstrate an unhealthy relationship between litigants, advocates, and other law enforcement officials. (Pamungkas, 2025) This practice not only violates the basic principles of a fair trial but also contradicts the provisions of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, specifically Article 3 paragraph (2), which emphasizes that any interference in judicial affairs by parties outside the judicial authority is prohibited, except in cases regulated by law. (Istirahat, 2023) The impact of this judicial mafia practice is very broad, ranging from declining public trust in judicial institutions to the erosion of the legitimacy of court decisions as representatives of justice.

One crucial factor that opens up space for judicial mafia practices is the existence of conflicts of interest among judges. A conflict of interest can be defined as a condition in which a judge has a personal interest, either directly or indirectly, that has the potential to influence their objectivity in deciding a case. (Suaib, 2025) It can take the form of family relationships, professional relationships, financial interests, or social closeness with the parties to the case. In the context of Indonesian positive law, this principle has been accommodated, among other things, in Article 17 paragraph (5) of Law Number 48 of 2009, which states that a judge is obliged to recuse himself if he has a direct or indirect interest in the case being examined. (Sari, 2023) Furthermore, the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct also prohibit judges from being independent and impartial. However, in practice, these provisions are often not implemented effectively, so conflicts of interest remain a loophole exploited by judicial mafia practices. (Kholiq, 2017)

The current legal framework further exacerbates this problem. Although various regulations governing judicial behavior exist, including the Judicial

Powers Law and regulations related to codes of ethics, regulations regarding conflicts of interest remain general and lack clear operational definitions and concrete testing mechanisms. (Septiyudia, 2024) There are no clear standards regarding the boundaries of conflicts of interest, disclosure procedures, or mechanisms for independent assessment of potential conflicts. Furthermore, sanctions for conflict of interest violations tend not to have a deterrent effect, either due to weak enforcement or inconsistent application of the norms. (Suprijatna, 2022) It reveals the urgent need to reformulate legal norms to be more responsive and adaptive to the complexities of judicial mafia practices.

On the other hand, weaknesses are also evident in the judicial oversight system, both internal and external. Normatively, judicial oversight is carried out by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission, as stipulated in Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution and Law Number 18 of 2011 concerning the Judicial Commission. However, in practice, there is often overlapping authority and limited coordination between these institutions. (Suaib, 2025) The lack of transparency in the investigation of alleged violations, as well as obstacles in proving conflicts of interest, prevents optimal oversight. (Maaroef, 2022) This situation ultimately results in the ineffectiveness of prevention and enforcement efforts against judicial mafia practices involving judges.

The implication of these various problems is the erosion of judicial independence and impartiality, which ultimately threatens the continuity of the principle of the rule of law itself. Court decisions, which should be a manifestation of justice, are instead seen as the result of compromises between certain interests, thus eroding public trust in the judiciary. (Durahman, 2017) Therefore, a comprehensive legal reform effort is needed, especially in regulating the conflict of interest of judges, through affirming norms, strengthening disclosure and recusal mechanisms, and improving the supervisory system. The research is relevant and novel because it specifically examines the conflict of interest of judges as an entry point for judicial mafia practices, which have not been analyzed in depth from the perspective of legal reform, so it is hoped that it can provide theoretical and practical contributions in strengthening the independence of the judicial power in Indonesia.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Judicial independence constitutes one of the most fundamental principles within a democratic state governed by the rule of law. The legitimacy of judicial institutions depends significantly on the ability of judges to perform their adjudicative functions free from external interference, personal interests, and undue influence. In Indonesia, the constitutional basis for judicial independence is established under Article 24 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, which recognizes judicial power as an independent authority to administer justice. This principle is further elaborated through Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power and the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct. However, despite the existence of these legal instruments, concerns regarding judicial impartiality continue to emerge due to persistent allegations of judicial corruption and judicial mafia practices. Consequently, the issue of judicial

conflicts of interest has become increasingly important as a determinant of judicial integrity and public confidence in the legal system.

The relationship between judicial independence and conflicts of interest is closely associated with the broader concept of impartial adjudication. A conflict of interest arises when a judge possesses personal, financial, familial, professional, or social interests that may influence, or appear to influence, the exercise of judicial duties. Within contemporary legal systems, conflict-of-interest regulations serve as preventive mechanisms designed to preserve judicial objectivity and institutional legitimacy. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of such regulations depends not only on the existence of legal norms but also on the availability of clear disclosure requirements, recusal procedures, and enforcement mechanisms. When these safeguards are inadequate, conflicts of interest may create opportunities for judicial misconduct and undermine public trust in the judiciary.

Previous studies have extensively discussed judicial independence as a fundamental element of constitutional democracy. Safa'at (2024) emphasizes that judicial independence represents an indispensable requirement for the realization of a state governed by law and the protection of constitutional rights. Similarly, Rachmadika (2024) argues that an independent judiciary functions as a safeguard against arbitrary governmental power and ensures the implementation of substantive justice. Situmorang (2024) further highlights that judicial reform efforts in Indonesia have consistently prioritized the strengthening of judicial independence and institutional accountability. These studies demonstrate the central role of judicial independence within constitutional governance. However, their analyses primarily focus on institutional independence and provide limited discussion regarding conflicts of interest as a specific threat to judicial impartiality.

Scholarly attention has also been directed toward the ethical dimensions of judicial conduct and impartiality. Ariyanti (2019) explains that judicial freedom must always be balanced with ethical responsibility and legal certainty. Husein (2019) similarly argues that judicial independence cannot be separated from the integrity and ethical behavior of judges in carrying out their judicial functions. Akbar (2023) further emphasizes that progressive judicial decision-making requires judges to remain free from personal interests that could compromise objectivity. These studies highlight the importance of ethical standards in maintaining judicial credibility. Nevertheless, they generally examine ethical obligations from a broad perspective and provide limited analysis concerning the operational regulation of judicial conflicts of interest within positive law.

The issue of judicial mafia practices has received considerable attention in Indonesian legal scholarship. Durahman (2017) identifies judicial corruption and procedural manipulation as major obstacles to the realization of justice within the Indonesian judiciary. Kholiq (2017) further argues that judicial mafia practices are often facilitated by weak legal culture and insufficient accountability mechanisms among judicial actors. More recently, Suprijatna (2022) and Septiyudia (2024) emphasize that bribery, case brokerage, and informal influence networks continue to undermine judicial legitimacy despite ongoing reform

efforts. Likewise, Suaib (2025) highlights the need for more comprehensive strategies to eradicate judicial mafia practices through institutional reform and stronger oversight mechanisms. Although these studies successfully explain the causes and consequences of judicial corruption, they generally focus on law enforcement and anti-corruption measures rather than examining conflicts of interest as a structural factor enabling judicial mafia practices.

Research concerning judicial oversight and accountability has also developed significantly. Maaroef (2022) explains that weaknesses in judicial supervision contribute substantially to the persistence of unethical judicial behavior and judicial corruption. Studies by Sari (2023) further indicate that effective judicial reform requires stronger coordination between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission in monitoring judicial conduct. Similarly, Sutrisno (2025) emphasizes that due process of law can only be realized when judicial institutions maintain both independence and accountability through effective oversight mechanisms. These findings suggest that judicial integrity depends not only on substantive legal rules but also on institutional supervision capable of identifying and addressing conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, existing studies rarely discuss the necessity of developing structured disclosure systems and recusal procedures as preventive measures against judicial misconduct.

In addition to oversight concerns, contemporary scholarship increasingly recognizes the importance of transparency in maintaining judicial impartiality. Sokong (2025) argues that judicial independence must be accompanied by accountability mechanisms that allow the public to assess the integrity of judicial decision-making. Pamungkas (2025) similarly observes that public trust in judicial institutions is closely linked to perceptions regarding fairness and impartiality. These studies indicate that transparency is essential in preventing situations where personal interests may influence judicial decisions. However, limited attention has been devoted to the formulation of specific legal standards governing conflict-of-interest disclosures, mandatory recusals, and independent review procedures within the Indonesian judicial system.

Although previous studies have examined judicial independence, judicial ethics, judicial mafia practices, judicial oversight, and accountability mechanisms, most of them address these issues separately and from fragmented perspectives. Existing scholarship generally focuses either on constitutional principles of judicial independence, ethical obligations of judges, corruption within the judiciary, or institutional supervision. Limited attention has been devoted to analyzing judicial conflicts of interest as a distinct legal phenomenon that directly connects judicial independence, judicial ethics, judicial corruption, and institutional accountability. Furthermore, there remains a lack of integrated analysis regarding the adequacy of Indonesian positive law in regulating conflicts of interest and preventing their exploitation within judicial mafia practices.

Accordingly, a significant research gap exists regarding the reconstruction of judicial conflict-of-interest regulations as a mechanism for strengthening judicial independence in Indonesia. This study seeks to fill that gap by examining the limitations of current legal regulations concerning judicial conflicts of

interest, analyzing their contribution to judicial mafia practices, and formulating a comprehensive legal reform model incorporating clearer definitions of conflicts of interest, mandatory disclosure obligations, strengthened recusal procedures, and integrated supervisory mechanisms. The novelty of this research lies in its effort to conceptualize judicial conflict of interest not merely as an ethical issue but as a structural legal problem that directly affects judicial independence, judicial accountability, and public confidence in the administration of justice, thereby necessitating comprehensive legal reconstruction to ensure a transparent, impartial, and independent judiciary.

METHODOLOGY

This research uses a normative juridical research method that focuses on the study of legal norms as a complete system through a review of primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials, with the aim of finding relevant legal arguments, concepts, and principles in answering the problems studied. The approach used includes a statute approach, namely by reviewing various laws and regulations related to judicial power, conflicts of interest of judges, and oversight mechanisms, such as the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, and other related regulations to identify the consistency, adequacy, and weaknesses of applicable legal norms. In addition, a conceptual approach is also used, which is conducted by reviewing legal concepts, doctrines, and expert opinions related to judicial independence, conflicts of interest, and judicial mafia, so that a strong theoretical basis is obtained for building legal arguments and formulating more comprehensive and systematic legal reforms.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Nature of Judicial Independence and Conflict of Interest in the Judicial System

The essence of judicial independence is the primary foundation for the implementation of judicial power as one of the pillars of a state based on the rule of law. In Indonesia, this principle is constitutionally affirmed in Article 1 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, which states that Indonesia is a state based on the rule of law, and Article 24 paragraph (1), which affirms that the judiciary is an independent authority to administer justice to uphold law and justice. The independence implies that judges, in conducting their judicial duties, must be free from all forms of intervention, whether from the executive, legislative, or other parties with an interest in the case being examined. (Sutrsino, 2025). Thus, judicial independence is not only structural but also concerns the judge's personal integrity in maintaining the objectivity of decisions.

Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power reinforces this principle through Article 3 paragraph (1), which states that in carrying out their duties and functions, judges are obliged to maintain judicial independence. Furthermore, Article 5 paragraph (1) of the same law emphasizes that judges are obliged to explore, follow, and understand the legal values and sense of justice that exist in society. It implies that judges must not be bound by subjective interests or

external pressures. Judicial independence is also closely related to the principle of impartiality, namely the obligation to be impartial in examining and deciding cases. This principle requires judges to have no personal interests in the cases they handle, so that the resulting decisions truly reflect objective and unbiased justice. (Sokong, 2025)

From an ethical perspective and international standards, the principles of judicial independence and impartiality are affirmed in various instruments, one of which is the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, which places independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety, equality, and competence as the primary values that must be upheld by judges. This principle is also reflected in the Indonesian legal system through the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct, which stipulate that judges must avoid any form of conflict of interest that could affect their independence. Thus, judicial independence is not only a legal obligation but also a moral and ethical obligation that must be internalized in every judicial action. (Ariyanti, 2019)

However, in judicial practice, judicial independence often faces serious challenges, one of which is a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest is a situation in which a judge has a personal interest, either directly or indirectly, that has the potential to affect the objectivity of carrying out their judicial duties. In Indonesian positive law, provisions regarding conflicts of interest can be found, among others, in Article 17 paragraph (5) of Law Number 48 of 2009, which requires judges to recuse themselves if they have a family relationship or a specific interest with a party in the case. This provision demonstrates that the law recognizes the importance of protecting judges from situations that could lead to bias in decision-making. (Akbar, 2023)

Conflicts of interest in the judiciary can arise in various forms, such as family relationships, professional relationships, financial interests, or social relationships with parties involved in the case. In fact, in some cases, conflicts of interest can be latent or indirect, yet still have the potential to impact judicial independence. Therefore, conflict of interest regulations are not merely normative; they must also be complemented by clear mechanisms for disclosure and recusal. In this regard, the principles of transparency and accountability are crucial to ensure that any potential conflicts of interest can be identified and handled appropriately. (HUSEIN, 2019)

Thus, it can be concluded that judicial independence and conflict of interest management are two inseparable aspects of maintaining the integrity of the judicial system. Although various provisions governing these matters are already in place, such as in the 1945 Constitution, Law Number 48 of 2009, and the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct, their implementation still faces numerous challenges. Therefore, strengthening regulations and more effective oversight mechanisms are needed to ensure that every judge is truly free from conflicts of interest, thereby maintaining judicial independence and enhancing public trust in the judiciary.

Regulation of Judicial Conflicts of Interest in Positive Law and the Practice of Judicial Mafia in Indonesia

The regulation of judicial conflicts of interest in Indonesian positive law essentially has a strong normative basis, both at the constitutional and statutory levels. Article 24, paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia affirms that the judiciary is an independent power, which implies that every judge must be free from personal interests and external intervention in carrying out their judicial functions. This principle is further elaborated in Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, specifically Article 3 paragraph (1), which emphasizes the obligation of judges to maintain judicial independence, and Article 5 paragraph (1), which requires judges to objectively explore legal values and a sense of justice. Within this framework, conflicts of interest are a crucial variable that must be avoided because they have the potential to undermine judicial independence and impartiality.

More specifically, provisions regarding judicial conflicts of interest can be found in Article 17 of Law Number 48 of 2009, which stipulates that judges must recuse themselves from examining a case if they are related by blood or marriage to a party in the case to a certain degree, or have a direct or indirect interest in the case. This provision acknowledges the potential for bias arising from personal relationships or other interests. Similar provisions are also found in various procedural laws, such as Article 157 of the HIR and Article 30 of the RBg, which regulate grounds for judicial recusal. However, these provisions are still limited to certain explicit conditions and therefore do not fully cover more complex and modern forms of conflict of interest, such as professional relationships or indirect economic interests.

In addition to statutory provisions, ethical aspects are also an important instrument in regulating judicial conflicts of interest. The Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct, established through a Joint Decree of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and the Chairperson of the Judicial Commission, regulates basic principles such as independence, impartiality, integrity, and propriety. The code of ethics emphasizes that judges must avoid all forms of conflict of interest, both actual and potential, that could give rise to the perception of impartiality. Judges are also required to maintain their behavior not only in court but also in their social lives to avoid doubting their independence. However, despite the comprehensive provisions, the code of ethics often faces obstacles in enforcement, particularly regarding the verification of evidence and the consistency of sanctions.

Weaknesses in the regulation and enforcement of these conflicts of interest have become a loophole exploited by the practice of judicial mafia in Indonesia. This judicial mafia, which encompasses bribery, case buying and selling, and interference with court decisions, often involves informal relationships between judges, advocates, and litigants. In this context, conflicts of interest do not always manifest explicitly but can be covert through social and professional networks. The provisions of Law Number 31 of 1999, in conjunction with Law Number 20 of 2001 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption, specifically Article 12 letters c and e, which regulate bribery of state officials, can be used to ensnare judicial mafia practices. However, this repressive approach is

insufficiently effective without strong preventive measures regarding conflicts of interest.

The practice of judicial mafia also demonstrates weaknesses in the judicial oversight system. Normatively, oversight is carried out by the Supreme Court as an internal supervisor and the Judicial Commission as an external supervisor, as stipulated in Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution and Law Number 18 of 2011 concerning the Judicial Commission. The Judicial Commission has the authority to maintain and uphold the honor, dignity, and behavior of judges. However, in practice, this authority is often limited to ethical aspects and does not encompass judicial aspects, thus leaving less scope for oversight of conflicts of interest. Furthermore, coordination between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission is also ineffective, resulting in weak handling of violations related to conflicts of interest.

Thus, it can be concluded that although Indonesian positive law has regulated conflicts of interest for judges through various instruments, both in statutes and codes of ethics, these regulations still have various weaknesses, both in terms of substance and implementation. Limitations in operational definitions, disclosure mechanisms, and a suboptimal oversight system generate conflicts of interest, a vulnerable loophole exploited by judicial mafia practices. Therefore, more comprehensive, and systematic legal reform is needed, not only to clarify norms but also to strengthen prevention and law enforcement mechanisms, so that judicial independence can be guaranteed in a real and sustainable manner.

Reconstruction of Judicial Conflict of Interest Regulations as an Effort to Strengthen Judicial Independence

Reconstruction of judicial conflict of interest regulations is a strategic step in strengthening judicial independence, which continues to face various challenges, both normatively and in implementation. Although existing legal frameworks, such as Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power and the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct, regulate the principles of independence and prohibition of conflicts of interest, these regulations remain general and are unable to address the complexities of evolving practice. Therefore, a reconstruction is needed that is not only normative but also operational, including a more comprehensive definition of conflict of interest, encompassing actual, potential, and public perception-based conflicts. Concrete actions that can be taken include revising relevant laws and regulations to include an operational definition of conflict of interest, along with measurable indicators to facilitate identification and law enforcement.

Strengthening disclosure mechanisms is a crucial step in preventing conflicts of interest. Judges should be legally required to disclose any potential conflicts of interest before examining a case, whether financial, family, or professional. This obligation can be explicitly regulated through amendments to the Judicial Powers Law or through binding Supreme Court regulations. One concrete action that can be taken is establishing an integrated digital reporting system, where each judge must periodically complete and update a potential

conflict of interest report, which can then be accessed by oversight bodies such as the Judicial Commission for verification.

In addition to disclosure, the mechanism for judicial recusal, or resignation, also needs to be systematically strengthened. Currently, regulations regarding judicial resignation are limited to certain conditions, as stipulated in Article 17 of Law Number 48 of 2009, but lack clear procedures and an effective oversight mechanism. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate standard procedures governing when and how judges are required to resign, including a mechanism for parties to submit objections in the event of a suspected conflict of interest. One concrete action that can be taken is establishing an independent panel within the judiciary tasked with objectively and transparently assessing and deciding on recusal requests.

Reconstruction must also address strengthening the judicial oversight system, both internally and externally. The Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission must be encouraged to develop a more integrated, technology-based oversight system so that any indication of a conflict of interest can be detected early. Concrete actions that can be taken include developing an integrated database system containing judge profiles, case histories, and potential relationships with certain parties, allowing for more accurate analysis of conflict-of-interest risks. Similarly, the Judicial Commission's authority needs to be strengthened so that it is not limited to ethical aspects but also plays a greater role in overseeing judicial behavior that impacts judicial independence.

Furthermore, reforms also need to be directed at enforcing stricter and more consistent sanctions for conflict-of-interest violations. To date, the sanctions imposed have tended to have no deterrent effect, either because they are lenient or because of inconsistent application. Therefore, harmonization of ethical, administrative, and criminal sanctions is necessary, particularly in cases of conflicts of interest that lead to judicial mafia practices. Concrete actions that can be taken include establishing clear classifications of conflict-of-interest violations and their legal consequences in legislation, and ensuring transparency in the sanction-imposing process for public scrutiny.

The reconstruction of judicial conflict of interest regulations must also be supported by changes in the legal culture among law enforcement officials. Judicial independence is determined not only by norms and systems, but also by individual integrity and commitment to professional ethics. Therefore, ongoing efforts are needed in the form of judicial ethics education and training, as well as the internalization of integrity values from the judicial recruitment stage. Concrete steps that can be taken include in-depth inclusion of conflict-of-interest material in the judicial candidate education curriculum and conducting regular evaluations of judicial integrity through a performance assessment mechanism based on adherence to the principles of independence and impartiality. With this combination of normative reform, system strengthening, and cultural change, it is expected that judicial independence can be realized in a tangible and sustainable manner.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the discussion outlined, judicial independence is a key pillar in ensuring the rule of law and substantive justice. However, in practice, it still faces serious challenges due to conflicts of interest, which have not been comprehensively and operationally regulated in Indonesian positive law. Although various provisions exist normatively, such as the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power, and the Code of Ethics and Guidelines for Judicial Conduct, these provisions remain flawed, particularly regarding the definition of conflicts of interest, disclosure mechanisms, resignation procedures, and the effectiveness of oversight and enforcement of sanctions. The situation unlocks space for the emergence of judicial mafia practices, which ultimately erode the independence and impartiality of judges and undermine public trust in the judiciary as a law enforcement institution.

In this regard, it is recommended that comprehensive and systematic legal reforms be implemented to regulate conflicts of interest among judges, both through revisions to legislation and by strengthening technical regulations within the judiciary. Concrete steps that must be taken include formulating a clearer and more operational definition of conflict of interest, mandating transparent and accountable disclosure and recusal mechanisms, and establishing an integrated, information-technology-based oversight system between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission. Furthermore, there is a need for firm and consistent enforcement of sanctions for every violation, as well as strengthening legal culture through judicial ethics education and the continuous improvement of judicial integrity. It is expected to effectively maintain the independence of the judiciary, thereby realizing a clean, transparent, and just justice system.

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